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ABSTRACT
GREGORY J. WOLF: Parties in the American Electorate.
(Under the direction of James Stimson)
Political scientists know a lot about the opinion dynamics of the electorate as a whole,
yet relatively little is known about the dynamics of mass parties. Much interesting distinct
variation between the parties in the electorate is covered up through aggregation. This dis-
sertation seeks to provide a better understanding of the American political system by incor-
porating measures of partisan opinion liberalism into distinct theories and models of macro
politics. The dissertation project is based on measures of partisan policy mood, which
gauge the demand for more or less liberal policy relative to the status quo for Democrats,
Republicans, and independents in the electorate from 1951 through 2012.
In the first empirical chapter I discuss the collection of these data and the process of
creating annual estimates of policy mood for Democrats, Republicans, and independents
in the electorate. I also provide an in-depth analysis of the over-time differences between
the symbolic and operational ideologies for these three groups. There are clear distinc-
tions between the symbolic and operational ideologies of Republicans and independents in
the electorate, but remarkable consistency between these two conceptions of ideology for
Democrats.
The second empirical chapter applies the thermostatic model of opinion change to
Democrats and Republicans in the electorate. The theory predicts similar opinion dynam-
ics for Democrats and Republicans over time. While the findings support the prediction
of parallel publics, the mechanism through which Democrats and Republicans respond to
change differs; Democrats are responsive to changes in public policy, whereas Republicans
are responsive to party control of government. Importantly, it does not appear as though
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policy significantly contributes to mass party polarization. I wrap up this chapter with a
discussion on how the perceptions of policy held by Democrats and Republicans in the
electorate can lead to the inference of mass party polarization even when the preferences
of both sets of partisans are congruent and stable.
The third empirical chapter focuses on representation. I develop a micro theory of par-
tisan representation based on a member of Congress’ electoral calculus to develop macro
level expectations about policy responsiveness to partisan opinion. The findings indicate
that policy is responsive to the opinion of the majority party’s mass partisans, while inde-
pendents and mass partisans of the out-party do not see their preferences translated into
public policy. The finding contradicts research on representation of the mass electorate, but
adds to the growing literature on the representation of sub-aggregate groups and represen-
tational inequality in the electorate.
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1 INTRODUCTION
“Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the indi-
vidual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation.”
∼ Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960)
Party identification is defined as an attachment that citizens have to a political party
(Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). It is a lens through which
citizens view the political world and shapes how they not only perceive the political en-
vironment, but how they navigate it (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell
et al. 1960; Stokes 1966; Shively 1979; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992;
Bartels 2000, 2002; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Cohen 2003; Kam 2005; Berin-
sky 2007; Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norporth, and Weisberg 2008; Lenz 2012). In collecting
political information, citizens tend to accept what is in agreement with their partisan pre-
conceptions, and reject what is not (Zaller 1992). Further, the vast literature on motivated
reasoning (e.g. Taber and Lodge 2006; Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009) suggests that parti-
sanship highlights specific cues in information processing that biases political perceptions.
These blue or red lenses might result in distinctive differences in sub-aggregate group opin-
ion change between Democrats and Republicans in the electorate.
In addition to shaping opinion, partisanship might affect how opinion changes, and in
consequence how opinion is represented. Recently scholars have begun to uncover great
disparities in the representation of sub-aggregate groups in the American electorate (e.g.
Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005; Kelly 2009; Enns and Wlezien 2011), and there is no reason
to think that this may not extend to the representation of partisans wearing red or blue.
Much interesting distinct variation between the parties in the electorate may be covered
up through aggregation. The causes, dynamics, and consequences of changes in partisan
opinion are important for understanding the political environment, especially in an era
of party polarization. In this dissertation I seek to provide a better understanding of the
American political system. First, I turn to a brief discussion partisanship and public opinion
in the literature.
1.1 Partisanship and Public Opinion in the Literature
The authors of The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) suggest that partisanship has
perhaps the most important influence on citizens political attitudes and behavior in Ameri-
can politics. In this seminal work these authors argue that partisanship is relatively stable,
though it can be altered by contemporaneous events. Fiorina (1981) further argues that
partisanship is a running tally, by which citizens update their partisanship through a con-
tinuous evaluation of the parties based on current and past events and is more variable than
Campbell et al. (1960) suggest. Moreover, MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989) (and
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002) find that partisanship in the aggregate is variable,
though systematic and gradual, and is subject to routine ebb and flow as citizens interact
in the political world. The primary focus of this project is how partisan attitudes affect the
macro polity. Specifically, I am interested in how partisans of different stripes respond to
the political world and how their preferences shape public policy.
Studies of aggregate public opinion, however, suggest that partisanship plays a lesser
role in movements in public opinion over time. Page and Shapiro (1992) find that Democrats
and Republicans in the electorate move in tandem (see also Soroka and Wlezien 2010).
This parallelism is not restricted to parties, as studies have found that other subgroups in
the electorate, such as gender, age, class, and education, all move in tandem (Page and
Shapiro 1992; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Enns and Kellstedt 2008; Ura and Ellis 2008).
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This has come to be known as the parallel publics thesis. Thus if Democratic and Repub-
lican opinion move in tandem over time, the the effects of partisanship on shaping opinion
must be minuscule.
The reason for such parallelism, as argued by (Enns and Kellstedt 2008), is that every-
one is receiving the same information, and thus respond similarly to changes in the political
environment.1 But there then seems to be a disconnect between these macro level effects
from the literature on the influence of partisanship in shaping individual attitudes. How-
ever, as noted above, partisanship acts as a lens though which citizens view and process
about political world they live in (Campbell et al. 1960; Fiorina 1980; Niemi and Jennings
1991; Finkel 1993). Further, it has been demonstrated that Democrats and Republicans
respond differently to objective political events (Bartels 2002) and receive and accept po-
litical information differently (Zaller 1992). Considering the influence partisanship has on
individual views, the finding of parallelism between Democratic and Republican opinion is
remarkable.2 For a long period in the latter half of the twentieth century, Democratic and
Republican opinion moved in tandem. However, as we will see in the next chapter, these
opinions have moved further and further apart over time.
The deviation of Democratic and Republican opinion parallels the polarization of Democrats
and Republicans in Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 2007; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal
2006). In this dissertation I seek to add to this literature on the influences of partisanship
on opinion, and how these opinions affect the American system of government.
1.2 The Approach
Herein I seek to add to the understanding of the American political system. The ex-
tant literature has covered the system well. Studies of macro politics have covered public
1Enns and Kellstedt (2008) are mostly focused the opinion of groups of different education and income
levels.
2Of all the population subgroups analyzed in Page and Shapiro’s (1992) seminal book, the parties in the
electorate showed the least amount of parallelism.
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opinion, representation, and elections. I do the same here with opinion change and rep-
resentation, incorporating the attitudes of the major parties in the electorate at the macro
level into the macro system.3 The motivation here is that the most important predictor of
individual level behavior in American politics is covered up through aggregation processes
in the study of the macro system. As stated above, political parties are important in the
processes of attitude formation, policy making, and elections. Ignoring parties and partisan
attitudes may distort the realities of the political world. Through incorporating mass parti-
san attitudes I hope to provide a better understanding of how politics works in America.
Thus I study politics from a macro level perspective in which the focus is on aggregates
rather than individuals. As such attention is paid not to the politics of individual partisans,
but partisan aggregates. However, the individual cannot be ignored. If we wish to under-
stand macro level movements, we must begin with micro level theories. From these micro
level theories we can then build macro level understandings about opinion and other politi-
cal changes (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). Because I am interested in change at
the macro level, the data and methods use times series to study the dynamic relationships
involving partisan attitudes, public policy, and representation.
1.3 Plan of the Dissertation
Substantively, I seek to provide a better understanding of the American political system
by taking the opinion liberalism, or ideology, of the parties in the electorate into account.
Of particular interest is how liberal or conservative each of these groups are over time.
To do this, of course, it is necessary to measure the opinion liberalism of Democrats and
Republicans over time; this is the focus of chapter 2. In chapter 2 I develop measures of
liberalism, based on Stimson’s (1999) public policy mood, for Democrats, independents,
and Republicans in the electorate. This results in annual measures of mood for Democrats,
3Technically speaking, the parties in the electorate are captured at the meso level. In the name of con-
sistency in the literature, I use the macro terminology simply to distinguish that I am not talking about
individuals.
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Republicans, and independents spanning the period 1951 through 2008. What is clear is
that for a long period of time, the parties in the electorate moved in tandem. However, in
the early 1990s the opinion liberalism of the parties start to polarize, thus ending the era of
parallel publics.
In chapter 3, I provide two ways to measure the ideology of the parties in the elec-
torate using the General Social Survey. The first of these is based on ideological self-
identification, called symbolic ideology, and the second is a similar measure of mood in-
troduced in chapter 2. I compare and contrast these data in a variety of ways, showing the
distinction between symbolic and operational ideology.
In chapter 4 I use these measures of Democratic and Republican mood to ask how
Democratic and Republican preferences for policy liberalism respond to the political envi-
ronment. I apply Wlezien’s (1995) model of public opinion as a thermostat to the parties
in the electorate, asking what moves partisan opinion. Applying an updated theory of the
thermostat (Coggins, Stimson, Atkinson, and Baumgartner n.d.) that considers the party of
the president as a thermostatic mechanism as well the model’s original input, public policy,
I find distinct differences in the responsiveness of Democrats and Republicans to the politi-
cal environment. Democrats are responsive to changes in public policy, while Republicans
are responsive to party control of the White House. The takeaway from this result is this
difference is likely indicative of differing perceptions of policy between Democrats and
Republicans.
The last empirical chapter, I consider how partisan opinion affects public policy through
representation. Here I ask whether or not the co-partisans of majority party’s in political
institutions, specifically Congress, are advantaged through representation. The answer, it
turns out, is “yes.” The finding supports some micro level understandings of dyadic repre-
sentation, while providing a contradiction to our understanding of macro level representa-
tion.
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Finally, chapter 6 attempts to bring the dissertation together, discussing how our under-
standing of movements in partisan opinion can help scholars of American politics to better
understand the American political system. In this chapter I also provide a plan for moving
this project forward through the addition of measure of partisan assessments of the parties
in government.
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2 PARTISAN MOODS IN THE UNITED STATES
Much is known about the shifts in the American public’s opinion liberalism over time.
These shifts in opinion have been well documented by Stimson (1999, 1991), who has
provided the most comprehensive time series of the public’s attitudes towards government
activity in the United States. These attitudes ebb and flow over time, responding to changes
in party control of government, economic conditions, and other exogenous factors. Though
there is significant variation in public opinion over time, these trends in opinion are remark-
ably stable and predictable. And yet there is much to be revealed about public opinion that
remains unknown; while we know a lot about the American electorate’s opinion liberalism
over time, we know relatively little about the subaggregate opinion of groups within the
electorate. The most important of these groups are the political parties in the electorate,
Democratic and Republican, as well as though who choose to not identify with a party,
independents.
2.1 Moving from Individual Partisans to the Aggregate Parties in the Electorate
Most of the studies on the opinion of partisans in the United States focus on the political
attitudes of individual partisans, analyzing the differences between Democrats and Repub-
licans (and sometimes independents). This research has informed us about how partisans
become loyal to their political party and also how an individual’s partisanship shapes his
or her political attitudes. Importantly, this research has uncovered important distinctions
in how partisans of different ilk interpret political messages, events, and stimuli. And yet
nearly all macro level research discards partisanship. “Macro” does, however, imply the
aggregate or the whole. In this case that is the entire public. However, a similar approach
to the study of macro politics can be taken by analyzing how meso level factors influences
maco level political outcomes. The approach here is distinct from previous studies of pub-
lic opinion change because I disaggregate the public and focus on the meso level of the
parties in the electorate. Much like what we observe with the public as a whole, we will
see orderly change in partisan opinion.
Focusing on opinion at the party level in the electorate allows us to distinguish between
the parties in the electorate beyond the attitudinal differences between Democratic and
Republican identifiers. By analyzing the aggregate parties in the electorate we can ask not
only what distinguishes the opinion of Democrats from the opinion Republicans, but why
and how changes in these opinions differ over time?
2.2 The Dynamics of the Parties in the Electorate
We know a lot about how partisan attitudes differ at the individual level. Likewise,
we know a lot about the opinion dynamics of the American public. They survey data are
plentiful to break the American public’s aggregate opinion down by party. However, only
recently has the technology become available that the collection of these data could be
done with ease. A countless number of questions have been asked of random samples of
the American public over time regarding their attitudes towards the scope of government
on a wide variety of issues. Often included in these surveys are questions that ask respon-
dents about their party identification. Using a respondent’s answer to the question of his or
her party deification, we can easily stratify the responses to questions regarding attitudes
towards the scope of government by party identification. Taking the meaning of party iden-
tification seriously, in particular as a psychological attachments, I only include individuals
who identify with one of the two parties in their respective party; independents, regard-
less of whether or not they lean towards one of the parties, are places in the independents
category.
To do this I use data from the General Social Surveys (GSS), American National Elec-
tions Studies (ANES), and Gallup Organization. Much of these data were collected through
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the Roper archive, which has archived opinion data regarding, and importantly, has made it
easy to break survey marginals down by party identification using RoperExplorer.1 From
these sources have over 75 specific questions asked between 1951 and 2008, for a total of
over 1,000 surveys. All of these questions ask respondents, generally speaking, whether
they want “more” or “less” government intervention on a specific issue - for example, “Are
we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on welfare?” or “Do you think
that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or
don’t waste very much of it?.” Each individual survey of the public provides information
about public preferences towards a specific issue. On its own, the individual survey item
provides little information; however, if we compare answers to one question with answers
to the same question at a different point in time, we can observe a tend in opinion. Ad-
ditionally, we can compare trends in answers to a question to other questions over time,
thus observing shared trends in opinion across issues. I use an algorithm developed by Jim
Stimson to create single indicators of opinion liberalism for each party in the electorate
from the many individual question series (see Stimson 1999, Appendix 1, for the specific
details of the algorithm).
Each of the questions are unique in that they address specific issues in a specifically
worded manner. But what is clear is that there is shared variance across the issues. While
there is some idiosyncratic component at the issue and question level, there lies an assump-
tion that there is some latent opinion underlying these individual attitudes towards gov-
ernment. What we want to uncover is that common, latent sentiment within Democratic,
Republican, and independent groups in the electorate.
2.2.1 Example Analysis: Three GSS Spending Priorities
When we look at individual questions over time, there should be parallel movements
in the responses to these questions within each group. This is well illustrated by looking
1I’d also like to thank Peter Enns, who collected much of these data.
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at three raw question series from the GSS. The lead for these three question items is, “We
are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inex-
pensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell
me whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the
right amount.” The survey then mentions a specific issue area, where respondents are asked:
“Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on [the issue in question].”
The issues used in this example are “improving the conditions of blacks,” “improving and
protecting the environment,” and “welfare.”
Figure 2.1 plots the over-time responses to these questions for Democrats, indepen-
dents, and Republicans in the electorate. Specifically, the scale on the left-hand side of the
figure is the percentage of respondents giving the “to little” response out of all respondents
who answered “too little” or “too much.” This provides the average number of Democrats,
independents, or Republicans who support doing more or less in each year the GSS issued
the survey.
The common patterns in the over-time responses to these questions are apparent in
Figure 2.1 for Democrats, independents, and Republicans in the electorate. The three se-
ries differ on the average level of support within each party in the electorate, and each
series also has its own particularities. Within each party, support for more spending on
the environment is the greatest, followed by race and welfare, respectively. For all three
groups, support for more spending on the environment is always above 60 percent. Support
for more spending on improving the conditions of blacks is always above 50 percent for
Democrats, and with the exception of 1976 and 1977, always above 50 percent for indepen-
dents; for Republicans, support for spending on this issue goes back and forth over the 50
percent mark over time. Democrats, however, are the only group that breaks the 50 percent
mark in support for more spending on welfare; independents and Republicans as collective
groups never break the 50 percent mark in support for more welfare spending.
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(a) Democrats
(b) Independents
(c) Republicans
Figure 2.1: Three GSS Series: Liberalism Index
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Table 2.1: Correlations of Between Three
GSS Spending Items by Party.
Environment Race Welfare
Democrats
Environment
Race 0.68
Welfare 0.70 0.74
Independents
Environment
Race 0.64
Welfare 0.43 0.67
Republicans
Environment
Race 0.80
Welfare 0.70 0.63
Note: N = 26
However, most importantly there is common movement between each series within
each partisan group. It is evident that these three issues have a common variance; when
one increase, so do the other two. This is evident in the covariation in change across each
of the three series split by party. The shared variance between the three series at the party
level is also evident by looking at the correlations between them. Table 2.1 displays the
correlation between each series for Democrats, independents, and Republicans. The high
correlations are further evidence of a shared, common component between each of the three
series within each group.
While support for more spending by issue varies within each party in the electorate,
the series of each issue are highly correlated; when support for more spending on one
issue increases, so too do the others (on average). This ends up being true of nearly every
domestic issue in American politics. The common variance shared across issues suggests
that there is an underlying ideology or mood affecting citizens attitudes towards specific
issues, and more generically, government. Using questions from these three areas and a
vast array of others, we can create a history of Democratic, Republican, and independent
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opinion towards the scope of government that captures each party in the electorate’s support
for more liberal (or conservative) policy.
2.2.2 Partisan Moods: Measurement and Product
Using GSS, ANES, and Gallup data, we can incorporate many questions across a vari-
ety of domestic issues that have been asked more than once since 1951, all of which capture
some underlying, latent opinion. Doing so allows us to create a more comprehensive and
precise measure of partisan sentiments towards government. Combining each series of
questions, however, is no straightforward task. This is because we cannot simply average
across the percentage of people in support of the liberal (or conservative) position on each
question within each year for each partisan group to generate an average level of support
across issues (and questions) for more liberal policy. This is, first, because the GSS, ANES,
and Gallup differ in their survey methodologies, which can result in different levels of sup-
port, even if questions wordings are identical. Second, while the GSS, ANES, and Gallup
ask similar questions regarding many of the same issues, differences in question wording
can also affect levels of support for the liberal or conservative position. Thus we need to be
able to take each series of questions independently and take these distinctions into account
before combining them into a single measure of opinion. The last issue is one of missing
data. Most of the questions used here are not asked on an annual basis. For example, most
questions from the ANES are only asked every two or four years. Similarly, the GSS, while
once an annual survey, switched to a biannual survey in 1994. Another issue with the GSS
is that it was only first administered in 1973. Thus if we want to extend the time series
backwards on an annual basis, we need survey questions from other survey houses, such as
Gallup, to do so. So a method is needed that can aggregate across each question series and
generate expected values for years in which the question was not asked based on what is
known about the opinion trends of the other question series.
The task sounds more difficult than it is thanks to Jim Stimson’s dyad ratios algorithm,
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as mentioned above. Stimson developed this algorithm for this exact purpose: to create a
measure of the public’s latent opinion liberalism. This is how it works. If the same question
is asked more than once by a survey house, we can tell whether support for the liberal
position went up or down each time the question was asked on that question. This results
in change ratios for each question item that capture the degree of change in the responses
to the specific question over time. Each question series is then rescaled to a baseline of
support and for each year that a question is asked, which yields whether or not responses
were higher or lower than the baseline and by how much. While the direct comparison of
responses between questions are not comparable, due to the reasons outlined above, the
ratios of measured values between any pair of questions are. The combination of these
ratios results in something like a weighted average, where questions that are asked more
frequently and/or that have larger samples receive more weight in the resulting measure.
This procedure allows for the use of 75 survey questions that can be broken down by
party identification. The result is a time series of latent opinion liberalism for each parti-
san group in the electorate, Democrats, Republicans, and independents. These “partisan
moods” are displayed in Figure 2.2 below. Before examining the history of these moods,
we should check how the components of mood, the individual survey items, fit with the
general movement of each partisan series.
Table 2.2 presents the 25 items that contribute most substantially to the first dimension
of each partisan mood. The table indicates that there are some distinct differences in the
issues that form coherent ideologies across the parties in terms of how much each issue
contributes to each general measure of opinion. However, of these items, New Deal issues,
along with race and environmental protection, are those that define the latent dimension
for all three mood series. For the most part, these issues are strongly associated with gov-
ernment power and the role of government in society, consistent with Stimson’s (1999)
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Table 2.2: Correlations of Issue Series with Estimated Partisan Moods: First Dimension
Survey
Item House Years Serial Moment Correlation
Democrats Independents Republicans
Spend (less) on military Gallup 14 0.83 0.74 0.81
Taxes too high Gallup 24 0.73 0.79 0.83
Taxes too high GSS 20 0.74 0.91 0.65
Government help sick GSS 18 0.79 0.66 0.83
Spend on environment GSS 26 0.77 0.53 0.78
Spend on race GSS 26 0.80 0.56 0.65
Gov. provide insurance NES 12 0.57 0.82 0.60
Death penalty Gallup 13 0.73 0.64 0.63
Spend on cities GSS 26 0.70 0.52 0.75
Approve labor unions Gallup 16 0.53 0.65 0.77
Spend on healthcare GSS 26 0.60 0.59 0.67
Spend on welfare GSS 26 0.66 0.71 0.48
Aid to minorities GSS 17 0.76 0.27 0.78
Government too much GSS 18 0.42 0.65 0.74
Spend on public schools NES 10 0.57 0.86 0.39
Government too powerful NES 12 0.77 0.60 0.42
Government provide jobs NES 17 0.61 0.59 0.57
Assistance to poor GSS 17 0.57 0.82 0.30
Improve schools GSS 26 0.74 0.55 0.40
Bus for racial balance NES 13 0.26 0.76 0.66
Government waste NES 21 0.43 0.59 0.64
Equal wealth GSS 19 0.52 0.53 0.53
Improve conditions of poor GSS 18 0.44 0.47 0.66
Spend on schools GSS 17 0.37 0.49 0.65
Gov. services & spending NES 12 0.35 0.62 0.44
measure of public mood. Most of the large differences between the associations of individ-
ual items and the respective partisan moods are not between Democrats and Republicans,
but between the two parties and independents (e.g. aid to minorities). This is perhaps of
no surprise, as the parties have developed platforms that should result in cohesiveness of
opinion amongst partisans; such a mechanism is absent amongst independents.
The Democratic, Republican, and independent mood series are largely based on New
Deal items, race, and other issues that have fallen along this scope of government dimen-
sion. So how do the time series of these partisan moods compare over time? Looking at
15
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Figure 2.2: Partisan Moods, 1951-2008
Figure 2.2, we see that the moods trend in ways that would be expected given what scholars
know about the movement of public opinion in the electorate over time. Liberalism is at
its highest points in the 1960s and trends in the conservative direction until Ronald Reagan
wins the presidency in 1980; these trends are consistent with Stimson’s mood data captur-
ing the preferences of the electorate. Unlike the GSS data presented above, the Mood data
presented here indicate that Republicans are not always above the 50 percent mark in their
preference for liberal policy. These more precise data show that Republicans prefer con-
servative policy in the mid-1950s, mid 1970s through the mid-1980s, and in nearly every
year following the Republican takeover of the House of Representatives in 1994. Similarly,
independents briefly indicate preferences for conservative policy in the late 1970s before
moving back in the liberal direction following the election of Ronald Reagan. Democrats
always prefer liberal policy, though is subject to similar ebbs and flows as Republicans
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and independents through time. There appears to be no difference in reaction to signifi-
cant events, such as Watergate, between Democrats, Republicans, and independents in the
electorate until the 1990s. Until the 1990s, each of the three Moods trend in opposition to
the party in the White House. From the series origin in 1951 through 1992, the correlation
between Democratic and Republican Mood is astoundingly high (r=0.90). This fits nearly
perfectly with Page and Shapiro’s (1992) finding of parallel publics between the parties in
the electorate. However, the correlation between Democratic and Republican Mood from
1993 through 2008 is extremely low (r = 0.08), significantly lower than in the previous
period. What is clear is that something changed in the early 1990s that caused these par-
tisan ideologies to deviate. It might be true ideological polarization, or it could simply be
the result of partisan sorting.
What is clear is that Democrats and Republicans in the electorate are farther from each
other ideologically than any point, at least, in the post-World War II era. In the next chapter
I seek to understand how partisan opinion changes, applying Wlezien’s (1995) thermostatic
model of opinion change to the parties in the electorate. I then use these same Mood data
to ask how partisan opinion affects representation in the United States.
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3 THE IDEOLOGICAL ATTITUDES OF MASS PARTIES IN AMERICA
The American political parties today are ideologically distinct in both government and
the electorate. However, this has not always been the case. In the 1950s, the Democratic
and Republican Parties were practically indistinguishable from one another (APSA 1950).
Since the 50s, the parties have become more distinct and are now considered to be “po-
larized” (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). While we know this about the parties in
government, much less is known about the ideology of the parties in the electorate, and
particularly how they have changed over time, let alone how these attitudes affect the po-
litical system. In this chapter I lay out the data used to capture these changes in partisan,
ideological preferences towards government. The question asked is, “how to the parties in
the electorate change ideologically over time?”
In American politics, ideology is generally characterized on a left-right, liberal-conservative
scale which underlies political attitudes. The left, liberal position today is one that is char-
acterized by government intervention in economic affairs and equality through the levelling
the playing field; the right, conservative position is synonymous with free markets and and
the belief that equality is achieve through hard work. Generically, liberal has come to be as-
sociated with government intervention (or “big government”), while conservative is largely
associated with limited government and states rights. But when voters hear the words “lib-
eral” and “conservative,” are these the associations that they are making? More than fifty
years ago Campbell et al. (1960) suggested that voters do not understand politics in ide-
ological terms. But this does not mean that voters do not hold real political attitudes that
fall on the left-right spectrum; the American public is not as nonideological as Converse
(1964) has suggested (Ellis and Stimson 2012; Zaller 1992).
Thus a distinction must be made between the symbols that are associated with the ide-
ologically charged words “liberal” and ”conservative” and true ideological policy prefer-
ences (Ellis and Stimson 2012). Symbolic ideology is meant to capture how voters think
of themselves ideologically in the political world (Conover and Feldman 1981). Tradi-
tionally, ideology is measured by asking respondents to place themselves somewhere on
the ideological continuum, typically on a Likert scale. While symbolic ideology captures
how individuals consider their personal political beliefs, it may not accurately reflect their
true, latent political preferences. The words “liberal” and “conservative” hold meanings to
individuals outside of politics, and are likely to influence an individual’s self-identified ide-
ological disposition. This identification is largely symbolic and may hold little relevance to
and individual’s underlying political attitudes. In the aggregate, symbolic ideology gauges
how the public thinks of itself ideologically. Because symbolic ideology is only weakly
tied to real political attitudes, we need a better way to understand ideology in American
politics that gauges real policy preferences.
If we consider that a citizen’s policy preferences fall along the ideological continuum,
then a case can be made that the summation of these preferences is a latent measure of ide-
ology. Ellis and Stimson (2012) call this operational ideology and reflects an individual’s
preferences towards the scope of government. For instance, Ellis and Stimson (pp. 17) ask
the following questions with respect to such preferences:
Should government redistribute income from wealthy citizens to poorer ones?
If so, how much? Should government be more or less involved in providing (for
example) health care to those who cannot afford it, income security to older
citizens, or job training to those who desire it? Should it strongly regulate
the activities of private business in the name of protecting the environment?
Should it spend more in national defense?
The positions that citizens can take on these issues is reflective of a more general, latent
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ideology that is distinct from symbolic ideology (Ellis and Stimson 2012). This conception
of ideology is not distorted by factors such as Biblical conservatism or a distaste for the
things that go along with word “liberal”). Operational ideology thus is devoid of all the
problems intertwined with symbolic ideology; it is devoid of nonpolitical content.
To examine the ideological distinctions, both symbolic and operational, between Democrats
and Republicans in the electorate over time, I need time serial data on the attitudes of
the American public that can be broken down by partisanship. I also need to be able
to compare symbolic and operational ideology. In this chapter I use data from the Gen-
eral Social Survey (GSS), which asks respondents about their party affiliation, ideological
self-identification, and views on variety of public policy issues regarding the scope of gov-
ernment. These data have the advantage of consistently asking the same policy oriented
questions over a period of almost forty years.1 These data allow for the comparison of
the symbolic and operational conceptions of ideology over time for the Democratic and
Republican parties in the electorate, as well as independent identifiers. Additionally, I this
allows for the comparison of these three distinct groups to the electorate as a whole in order
to see how each of the groups relates to the mass electorate.
3.1 Symbolic Ideology in the Electorate
Let’s first examine symbolic ideology. Respondents on surveys regarding political atti-
tudes are frequently asked whether they considered themselves to be politically liberal or
conservative. For example, the General Social Survey (GSS) asks respondents to answer
the following question:
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I’m going to
show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might
hold are arranged from extremely liberal–point 1–to extremely conservative–
point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
1While the American National Elections Survey (ANES) provides for a more lengthy period of analysis,
the questions are not well suited for measuring operational ideology.
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The question is meant to measure the ideology of the respondent and is known as self-
identified, or symbolic, ideology. It is frequently used as such in models of voting behav-
ior, presidential approval, and political participation in micro level analyses. For example,
Fiorina (2009; 2005) uses symbolic ideology to demonstrate how moderate the American
public is and the lack of polarization between Democrats and Republicans in the elec-
torate. Levendusky (2009) similarly uses symbolic ideology in a discussion of partisan
sorting. Symbolic ideology has also been used by scholars as a predictor of vote choice
and candidate evaluation in elections (Abramowitz 1981; Bonneau and Cann 2015; Ensley
2007; Jacoby 2003; Lewis-Beck 1988; Lyons and II 1992; Palfrey and Poole 1987; Squire
and Smith 1988; Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs 1997). The results of symbolic ideology
across many of these studies of mixed, and often weak relative to other factors. Simply put,
it is not a good predictor of choice or candidate placement because it poorly captures polit-
ical attitudes. But that does not mean it is unimportant. Symbolic ideology is not random
and may have meaningful movement over time.
Using GSS data covering the years 1974 through 2012, I break down the proportion of
GSS respondents identifying as liberal, conservative, and moderate, in the electorate and
for Democratic, Republican, and independent identifiers.2,3 These data are plotted in Figure
3.1.
Looking first at the electorate as a whole (see Panel (a), Figure 3.1), the modal re-
sponse throughout the period is the moderate identification, indicating that a plurality of
respondents identify as ideologically moderate for nearly the entire time period. This is
also the case with respondents who identify as independents in regard to their partisanship
(see Panel (b), Figure 3.1). The proportion of symbolic moderates increases from about 46
2Extremely liberal, liberal, and slightly liberal are all folded into the “liberal” category, while extremely
conservative, conservative, and slightly conservative are all folded into the “conservative” category. Gaps in
the GSS series are filled using linear interpolation.
3Taking the meaning of party identification seriously, independents who said they lean towards one of the
parties are counted as independents.
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(a) Electorate (b) Independents
(c) Democrats (d) Republicans
Source: General Social Survey.
Figure 3.1: Proportion of Liberal, Moderate, and Conservative Symbolic Identification in
the Electorate and by Party Identification, 1974-2012.
percent of independents to nearly 60 percent in the early 1990s, before decreasing to the
mid 50s in the early 2010s. The moderate symbolic ideology always reaches a majority
among independents in the electorate. The proportion of symbolic moderates, however, is
lower among Democratic and Republican partisans in the electorate. But the difference is
not a large one. The proportion of symbolically moderate Democrats is relatively stable
through the entire series, never deviating from approximately 40 percent of Democratic
identifiers. Conversely, while Republicans have nearly the same proportion of symbolic
moderates as Democrats in the mid-1970s, but the proportion of these symbolic moderates
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declines dramatically over time. By the mid-2000s only a quarter of Republicans state that
they are ideologically moderate, moderately increase by a few percent towards the end of
the decade.
Of greater interest is the rise of symbolic liberalism in Democrats and symbolic con-
servatism in Republicans over the course of these thirty-eight years, the ideologies we
typically associate the two parties with in modern American politics. The proportion of
Democrats who identify as symbolically liberal is 36 percent in the mid-1970s and in-
creases by approximately eight percent to 44 percent by the early 2010s (see Panel (c),
Figure 3.1). During this period, symbolical liberalism overtakes the symbolic moderate
identification as the modal response for Democrats in the electorate. However, the propor-
tion of moderate, Democratic identifiers remains stable, at around 40 percent, through the
entire series. The decline in symbolic conservatism within Democratic identifiers is picked
up by a rise in symbolic liberalism. In contrast, there is a steady decline in symbolic lib-
eralism for both independents and Republicans in the electorate over this period, which is
also true for the mass electorate. This result is consistent with recent findings by Ellis and
Stimson (2012) on the ideological self-identification of the electorate.
The decline in symbolic liberalism by Republicans in the electorate is accompanied by
a substantial increase in symbolic conservatism (see Panel (d), Figure 3.1). A plurality
of Republicans, slightly above 40 percent, identify as conservative in the mid-1970s and
this proportion increases to solid majority of 65 percent in 2012. The increase in symbolic
conservatism comes at the expense of both symbolic moderates and liberals within the set
of Republican partisans. Symbolic liberalism decreases from 20 percent in 1974 to less
than 10 percent in 2012, while the moderate identification decreases by nearly the same
percentage, going from 38 percent in 1974 to 26 percent in 2012. Within both parties
in the electorate, the symbolic ideological identity associated with each respective party
(liberal with Democrats, conservative with Republicans) is the modal symbolic ideological
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identification among partisans at the end of the period of analysis in 2014.
The large number of moderate identifiers within each group presented above might
cloud the picture as to the symbolic ideology of the parties in the electorate. Many respon-
dents may be unsure what “liberal” and “conservative” mean and thus choose the moderate
response as a safe response. At the same time, informed respondents with truly mod-
erate opinions may also choose the moderate response. This makes it difficult to draw
information about self-identifying ideological moderates, as noted by Stimson (2004). To
gain a better perspective we can look at the symbolic ideology of mass Democrats and
Republicans by looking only at GSS respondents who identify as liberal or conservative,
eliminating those who choose the “moderate” response. Doing so provides better, more
clear look at the trends of symbolic ideology within each party. Figure 3.2 plots the sym-
bolic liberalism of Democrats and Republicans in the electorate for the years 1974 through
2012.4
Figure 3.2 shows a clear polarization of symbolic ideology between the Democratic and
Republican Parties in the electorate over time. Looking only at Democratic and Republican
partisans who symbolically identify as liberal or conservative, there is a clear trend towards
liberalism within the Democratic Party and a strong trend towards conservatism within the
Republican Party. Democratic symbolic liberalism increases from around 60 percent in the
mid-1970s to a high of 75 percent in 2010, never falling below 50 percent. The decrease
in symbolic liberalism within the Republican Party in the electorate is much stronger shift,
starting at a high of nearly 32 percent in 1974 and declining to nearly 10 percent in 201,
with a low of nine percent in 2008). While the domination of the symbolic conservatism
continues in the mass electorate (Ellis and Stimson 2012), symbolic liberalism is steadily
increasing within the Democratic partisans.
4The figure plots the number of respondents identifying as liberal divided by the number of respondents
who identify themselves as liberal or conservative.
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Source: General Social Survey.
Figure 3.2: Symbolic Ideology by Party Identification, 1974-2012.
While Figure 3.2 show a clear polarization of symbolic ideology between Democratic
and Republican mass partisans over time, it is unclear what what this actually means for
the political system. It might be evidence of increasingly polarized mass parties or sorting,
but it is hardly indicative of polarizing ideological preferences on public policy between
Democrats and Republicans in the electorate. This is because of the disconnect between
symbolic ideology and ideological policy preferences. While a majority of Americans
identify as politically conservative, a majority of Americans also prefer liberal policy to
conservative policy (Stimson 2004; Ellis and Stimson 2012). This is a paradox scholars
have only recently began to investigate in detail. In the next section I go into further detail
on operational ideology, which tells us about the ideology of the electorate.
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3.2 Operational Ideology in the Electorate
As we saw in the previous chapter, a better understanding of the ideological preferences
of parties in the electorate can be had by looking at operational ideology. Even though
citizens may not speak in ideological terms (i.e. know what “liberal” and “conservative”
mean) ((Converse 1964)), they can and do express truly held policy preferences (Zaller
1992). In this section of the chapter I create measures of partisan moods using only GSS
data, in order to allow for a direct comparison with symbolic ideology from the same
data source. Similar to the measurement strategy employed in the previous chapter, I use
questions that generally ask respondents whether the federal government should do more
or less in a specific policy domain. The resulting measures of opinion are similar to the
measures of mood presented in the previous chapter, though as less precise and cover a
shorter time span.
3.2.1 Measuring Mood with the GSS
The GSS has asked 10 questions about preferences towards government spending on
general issue areas consistently over time. Responses to these questions are coded in the
liberal or conservative direction, based on preferences for more or less government where
“more” is the liberal position and “less” is the conservative position, with the exception
of foreign policy related items which are coded in the reverse.5 Principal components
factor analysis suggests that these questions load on one dimension, accurately capturing
preferences towards government spending across a variety of domains. These are issues
that we typically consider gauge preferences towards the scope of government. Included
in this dimension are preferences on traditional distributive and redistributive issues which
represent “who gets what” in American politics (Ura and Ellis 2008). More importantly,
it captures the traditional “liberal-conservative” conflict over the proper size and role of
government. Thus, this dimension is a suitable proxy on the conventional economic and
5Questions and coding procedure can be found in Appendix A.1.
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scope of government that has divided liberals and conservatives for the latter half of the
twentieth century.
Net liberal-conservative preference scores are created for each respondent in the GSS
by coding each of the ten questions in a liberal, neutral, or conservative direction and
summing across these ten questions for each respondent. Following Ura and Ellis’ (2008)
method, this yields score a for individuals that can range from -10 to +10 where higher
scores indicate higher levels of liberalism. I then take this scale and convert it to a scale
that ranges from zero to 100, resembling Stimson’s Policy Mood on which this measure is
based.
The next step is to stratify respondents by party. To do so I simply separate individuals
into Democrats, Republicans, and independents based on their self-reported party identifi-
cation as done above with symbolic ideology.6 I then aggregate across each set of identifiers
to create annual measures of partisan mood for Democrats, Republicans, and independents.
Gaps for years in which the GSS was not administered are filled using linear interpolation.
These measures of operational ideology, or “Mood,” for Democrats, Republicans, and in-
dependents in the electorate are displayed in Figure 3.3.
The operational ideology data show a different story than does symbolic ideology. Each
set of identifiers, Democrats, Republicans, and independents, all have an average prefer-
ence for liberal policy through the entire series. Unlike symbolic ideology, each group
indicates a preference for more liberal policy over time, on average. I will provide more in-
depth analysis of the operational ideology for Democrats, Republicans, and independents
below, with a more finely tuned measure of operational liberalism. But before moving on,
I want to delve further into the discrepancies between symbolic and operational ideology
at the mass party level.
6As a reminder, independents who said they lean towards one of the parties are counted as independents
because they do not identify with a party.
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Source: General Social Survey.
Figure 3.3: Operational Ideology by Party Identification, 1973-2012.
3.3 Comparing Operational and Symbolic Ideology
More can be learned about the ideological composition of the electorate and the mass
parties by comparing symbolic and operational ideology within and across each party in
the electorate. While both measures provide an answer as to how liberal or conservative
the public or parties in the electorate are, they have different meanings; only one tells us
about ideological policy preferences.
Figure 3.4 presents the comparisons of operational and symbolic ideology for the elec-
torate as a whole, independents, Democrats, and Republicans in the electorate over time.7
Panel (a) plots the symbolic and operational ideology of the entire electorate. The differ-
ence between symbolic and operational ideology is nearly 20 percent. At no point do the
two series overlap; operational ideology is always at a higher level than symbolic ideology.
7All four panels are presented on the same scale so that comparisons can easily be made across groups.
However, doing so makes it difficult in some instances to see differences between trends in operational and
symbolic ideology.
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(a) Electorate (b) Independents
(c) Democrats (d) Republicans
Source: General Social Survey.
Figure 3.4: Comparing Operational and Symbolic Ideology in the Electorate and by Party
Identification, 1973-2012.
Further, the correlation between the symbolic ideology of the electorate and its operational
ideology is weak and negative (r=-0.10), consistent with previous findings on the relation-
ship between symbolic and operational ideology (Stimson 2004; Ellis and Stimson 2012).
There are similarly weak connections between the symbolic and operational forms of
ideology for independent and Republican identifiers. While independents (see Panel (b))
consistently prefer liberal policy, more often than not they identify as conservative, on
average. The average difference between the two measures of ideology for independents
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is slightly more than 15 percent. Again, operational ideological is consistently higher than
symbolic ideology for the entire series, though there is overlap in the range of each. While,
symbolic ideology is nearly identical to operational ideology in 1982, but the two series are
practically unrelated with a correlation of r=-0.06.
The stark difference between operational and symbolic ideology is most striking for
Republicans in the electorate (see Panel (d), Figure 3.4). Republicans consistently prefer
liberal policy but also consistently identify as conservative. The difference between op-
erational and symbolic ideology in this case is staggering, with an average difference of
roughly 35 percent. The correlation between Republican operational ideology and sym-
bolic ideology is weak (r=0.14), which fits neatly with Ellis and Stimson’s 2012 recent
findings regarding conflicted conservatives.
The weak relationship between operational and symbolic ideology, however, does not
hold up for Democrats in the electorate (see Panel (c), Figure 3.4). In this case opera-
tional and symbolic ideology trend together and are similar in level. The average differ-
ence between symbolic and operational ideology for Democratic partisans is only about
five percent. Further, the two series correlated strongly at r=0.61. Considering the mass
electorate’s general disposition to favor liberal policy and Democratic partisans’ inclination
to identify as liberal, perhaps this strong relationship should not be surprising. Importantly,
this shows that operational and symbolic ideology are not completely disconnected.
3.4 Conclusion
Individuals who identify as liberal truly are liberal politically. Liberals do not conflate
their symbolic ideology with other meanings as individuals identifying as conservative are
prone to do. This may be due to a greater link between liberal and Democratic identities
than that between conservative and Republican identities. While the conservative identi-
fication can take on many different meanings to people who claim that identification, the
liberal identity is perhaps more easily connected to liberalism in government and the party
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that represents liberals. In the chapters that follow I examine how these attitudes factor into
the political system in the United States.
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4 PARTISAN THERMOSTATS: OPINION CHANGE AND PUBLIC POLICY
The previous chapter introduced the measures of Democratic and Republican Moods
and discussed how these measures have ebbed and flowed over time. There was a clear
trend against the party of the president for both groups, but such trends are not meaningful
unless we can explain them and do so and provide clear evidence of causal effects. In this
chapter I investigate what causes these Moods to change. Specifically, I evaluate whether
or not Democrats and Republicans in the electorate respond similarly or distinctively to
changes in political stimuli. In an era where much talk is made of mass party polarization,
the opinion dynamics of the mass parties can help shed further light into the ongoing debate
(see Abramowitz 2011; Hetherington 2009; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Layman,
Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). Considering the contemporary political environment, it might
not be unexpected to find distinctive differences in partisan opinion change. If partisan
responses to political stimuli are different between Democrats and Republicans, then we
may be able to trace the relatively new phenomenon of mass party polarization to its origin.
However, using today’s politics to make judgements about opinion trends over time is not
a fruitful exercise and may bias our expectations towards finding evidence of polarizing
effects. Thus I use Wlezien’s (1995) model of opinion change to develop expectations
about the similarities or differences in partisan opinion dynamics. First, however, we need
to know how partisanship can affect opinion.
4.1 The Influence of Partisanship on Political Attitudes
Partisanship affects the perceptions, demands, and values that citizens hold towards
government and acts as a useful information tool to citizens (Bartels 2002; Campbell et al.
1960; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992). Because partisans of different ilk
may hold differing perceptions and opinions towards government, partisanship may result
in distinctive differences in subgroup opinion change between Democrats and Republicans
in the electorate. Page and Shapiro (1992) find that partisan subgroups are nearly the only
subgroups in the population that indicate divergent opinions (on single issue items) over
time. Their results indicate that Republicans are the partisan group deviating from the “tra-
ditional” path, a finding further supported in recent work by Ura and Ellis (2012; see also
Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Page and Shapiro (1992, pp. 311) argue that these divergent
trends are “undoubtedly related to party leadership of opinion,” because citizens receive
and adjust their preferences from trusted, co-partisan cue-givers. However, this may not
be the case at all. In a more recent study Saeki (2013) finds that members of Congress do
not act as opinion leaders to their co-partisans in the electorate. Further, Enns and Kell-
stedt (2008) suggest that everyone responds in similar patterns to changes in the political
environment because everyone receives the same information.
It has also been demonstrated that public opinion is highly responsive to public policy
(Wlezien 1995, 2004; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). Here I focus on how the
main product of government, public policy, affects partisan opinion change. In addition to
policy outputs I also consider how party control of the White House might affect citizens
perceptions of public policy. I consider these two pieces, policy and party control, to be the
primary movers of public opinion and apply Wlezien’s (1995) thermostatic model to gen-
erate expectations about how the two parties in the electorate, the subgroups of Democratic
and Republican identifiers, respond to these primary movers.
4.2 The Thermostatic Model
Wlezien (1995) proposes a model of the policy making process in which the liberalism
of policy outcomes are a function of public opinion. The public acts like a thermostat and
policy makers act like a HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning) unit (or, more
simply, furnace and air conditioner). The public has a preferred temperature. When the
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temperature is colder than the preferred temperature, the public demands more heat and
signals a preference for more heat to policy makers. Policy makers respond by turning
on the furnace, increasing the temperature. As the temperature approaches the public’s
preferred temperature, the demand for more heat decreases. When the temperature gets too
hot for the public and moves beyond the public’s preferred temperature, the public demands
a cooler temperature. The cycle continues.
The relationship between public opinion and policy is similar. In policy terms, the
model suggests that the public has some ideological preference towards public policy.
When policy is more liberal than this preference, the public demands more conservative
policy; when policy is more conservative than this preference, the public demands more
liberal policy. The demand for more liberal or conservative policy sends a signal to policy
makers that policy has moved too far in one direction, to which the policy makers respond.
The public’s demand for policy change can be expressed as:
Rt = P
∗
t − Pt
where R is relative preferences, P∗ is the public’s preferred level of policy, P is the current
level of policy output, and t is a point in time. This is the thermostatic model.1
Relative preferences, R, are the focus here and are something political scientists know
quite a bit about. Stimson’s mood (1999; 1991) is an aggregate measure of the public’s
relative preferences, gauging whether or not the public demands more or less liberal policy
from government.2 By breaking down these demands by partisanship we can learn not only
1For a good, comprehensive illustration of the thermostatic model see Chapter 2 of Soroka and Wlezien
(2010).
2Mood is made up of survey questions that gauge both relative and absolute preferences, but is predom-
inantly the former. The questions that go into the partisan moods series used here are nearly all questions
regarding relative preferences. The values of Mood are simply the percentage of the electorate indicating a
preference for “more liberal” policy out of all of those who indicate a preference for “more liberal” or “more
conservative” policy.
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about the differences in policy demand between each set of partisans, but also how each
responds to changes in the policy environment.
4.3 Partisan Opinion and Public Policy: Applying the Thermostat
To generate expectations about how the average opinion of Democrats and Republicans
in the electorate change I apply the thermostatic model to both groups of partisan identifiers.
If the expectations for changes in Democratic and Republican opinion are the same, then
the application provides a policy-based theoretical underpinning for Page and Shapiro’s
(1992) finding of parallel publics.3 If the prediction yields an expectation of divergence,
then the application of the theory provides for a policy-based, thermostatic understanding
for mass party ideological polarization.
4.3.1 Modelling Aggregate Partisan Relative Preference Change
In generating expectations for Democratic and Republican opinion change in the ther-
mostatic context, it is first necessary to make assumptions about distribution of ideological
preferences for both parties in the electorate. In the terms of the thermostatic model, these
ideological preferences are absolute preferences, P ∗.
Consider each party in the electorate as a collection of individuals identifying with the
same political party, Democratic or Republican. Assume that each individual has some la-
tent absolute preference towards the scope of government along the right-left, conservative-
liberal ideological spectrum and these absolute preferences are fixed over time. For intuitive
purposes, let’s assume cardinal utility and that this ideological spectrum is on a scale that
ranges from 0 to 100 for both absolute policy preferences and policy where higher values
are more liberal. Next assume that the mean absolute preference of Republican identifiers
is 45, the mean absolute preference of Democratic identifiers is 55, and that individual pref-
erences within each party are distributed standard normal within this policy space.4 Thus
3Enns and Kellstedt (2008) provide an explanation for parallel publics based on the information environ-
ment with the application across different subgroups of educational attainment. However, they do not test the
different between two groups so ideologically divided, such as parties in the electorate.
4The assignment of these values is arbitrary and are used only for the purpose of illustrating how relative
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Note: Hypothetical distribution of absolute preferences for Democrats and Republicans. P ∗D is the cen-
tral tendency of Democratic absolute preferences and P ∗R is the central tendency of Republican absolute
preferences.
Figure 4.1: Partisan Distribution of Preferences
we have a policy space in which the variance of absolute preferences for both the Demo-
cratic and Republican parties in the electorate is standardized, and Democrats are more
liberal than Republicans, on average.5 These hypothetical distributions are displayed in
Figure 4.1, where P ∗R and P ∗D indicate the median preferred level of policy, or absolute
preference, for the Republican and Democratic Parties in the electorate, respectively.
The next step is to consider the relative preferences (R) of Democratic and Republican
partisans. Relative preferences are the difference between absolute preferences and policy.
In the aggregate, we can observe the proportion of partisan identifiers who prefer more
liberal (or conservative) policy than the status quo to get a mean relative preference for
Democrats and Republicans in the electorate.6 This is a party in the electorate’s relative
preference. With these assumptions and definitions in place, we can input policy into the
preferences change when policy changes. The logic is more general.
5This assumption of a standard normal distribution is in place for computational simplicity, allowing for
the direct comparison of relative preference change between the parties in this hypothetical exercise.
6I refer to relative preferences in terms of the liberal response, “more liberal” and “less liberal” for consis-
tency, but could just as easily substitute “more conservative” in place of “less liberal” as they are equivalent.
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(a)
(b)
Note: These figures show Democratic and Republican preferences in the electorate time t where policy is
located at 50 and time t+1 where policy is at 45. P ∗D is the central tendency of Democratic absolute
preferences, P ∗R is the central tendency of Republican absolute preferences, and P is policy. Figures not to
scale.
Figure 4.2: Policy and Relative Preference Change from Time t to t+1.
same ideological space to observe changes the relative preferences of the two parties in the
electorate.
Let’s start with the assumption that policy is located at 50 on our hypothetical policy
continuum, which is the center of policy space, at time t. Individuals with an absolute
preference greater than 50 prefer more liberal policy, while individuals with an absolute
preference lower than 50 prefer less liberal policy. This is illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure
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4.2. Using probability theory, the percentage of Democratic and Republican identifiers pre-
ferring more liberal policy than the status quo can be calculated.7 This percentage serves as
a hypothetical measure of aggregated relative preferences, the percent of partisan identifiers
demanding “more liberal” policy. In this scenario the percentage of Democrats preferring
more liberal policy than the status quo is 64 percent, while the percentage of Republi-
cans preferring more liberal policy than the status quo is 36 percent. What is clear is that
a majority of Democrats demand more liberal policy, whereas a majority of Republicans
demand less liberal policy. But what happens when policy changes?
The dynamics between policy and opinion change can be added in by observing how
relative preferences within each party change when policy changes from time t to t+1. As-
sume that policy moves from 50 at time t to 45 at time t+1. This change is illustrated
in Panel (b) of Figure 4.2. Individuals to the left of 45 will be unaffected by this change
and continue to demand less liberal policy. Likewise, individuals to the right of 50 will
be unaffected by this change in policy and continue to demand more liberal policy. How-
ever, individuals with an absolute preference between 45 and 50 in the policy space will
be affected by this change in policy. While policy was more liberal than these individu-
als’ preference at time t, policy has become less liberal than their absolute preferences at
time t+1. These individuals change their expressed relative preference of demanding “less
liberal” policy at time t to “more liberal” at time t+1.
At time t+1 76 percent of Democrats prefer more liberal policy, while 50 percent of Re-
publicans prefer more liberal policy. To calculate the change in mean relative preferences
for both aggregated groups of partisan identifiers, we can simply take the first difference be-
tween the percentage of each party’s identifiers demanding more liberal policy from time
7This computation serves as the reason for the assumption of a standard normal distribution of absolute
preferences for both sets of partisan identifiers. Additionally, it allows for a simple comparison of changes in
relative preferences between Democrats and Republicans.
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t to t+1. For Democrats, the percentage of identifers demanding more liberal policy in-
creases from 64 percent to 76 percent, an increase of 12 percent. Similarly, the percentage
of Republican identifiers demanding more liberal policy increases from 36 percent to 50
percent, an increase of 14 percent.
What is clear is that the preference of more liberal policy for both groups increases from
time t to t+1 as policy becomes less liberal, suggesting a similar response to policy change
in the aggregate for the Democratic and Republican Parties in the electorate. When policy
is moved in the conservative direction, the percentage of Democrats and Republicans pre-
ferring more liberal policy increases. However, the increase in preferences for more liberal
policy is larger for Republicans than Democrats since policy is moving into the density
of Republican absolute preferences and towards the tail of the distribution of Democratic
absolute preferences.
The expectation then is that when policy changes the relative preferences of both par-
tisan groups will move in the same direction. When policy becomes more conservative,
the aggregate relative preference for more liberal policy for each party in the electorate in-
creases. Conversely, when policy is moved in the liberal direction, it is similarly expected
the aggregate relative preference for more liberal policy within each party to decreases.
While the change in aggregate relative preferences for the Democratic and Republican Par-
ties in the electorate are not identical, they are similar in that they change in the same
direction, and thus result in imperfect parallelism over time. This comports well with Page
and Shapiro’s (1992) finding of parallel publics, and provides a theoretical expectation for
their empirical observation.8
8Page and Shapiro (1992) did not explicitly test the differences or similarities of opinion responsiveness
between Democrats and Republicans, they merely observed parallelism between opinion trends on specific
issues between the two parties.
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4.3.2 Partisan Opinion and Party Control
But policy may not be the only mechanism through which citizens adjust their demands
for government services and policy.9 The trends in Democratic and Republican Moods
observed in Chapter 2 clearly showed a negative trend in relation to the party of the White
House. But more than simple observation is necessary to understand how party control of
the presidency can affect opinion change.
Knowing nothing about new policy enactments, citizens may still change their demand
for more liberal or conservative policy through party-based cues received from the political
environment. Changes in preferences may be directly related to party control of govern-
ment (Page and Shapiro 1992).
Citizens rely on shortcuts to inform them about public policy (Popkin 1991) and parti-
sanship serves as an important heuristic device that citizens use to sort political information
(Sniderman, Glaser, and Griffin 1990; Huckfeldt, Levine, Morgan, and Sprague 1999; Bar-
tels 2002; Schaffner and Streb 2002). Further, political parties have reputations that citizens
are well aware of. Citizens, especially those who identify with a political party, are gener-
ally aware that the Democratic Party is liberal, that the Republican Party is conservative,
and are aware of the rifts between the two parties (Sniderman and Stiglitz 2012).10 Citizens
use these party signals that come from political leaders, such as the president and members
of congress, to form political opinions (Carmines and Kuklinski 1990; Mondak 1993a,b).
These party-based cues play an integral role in how citizens make inferences about public
policy even when citizens know little about the goings on in Washington.
While citizens do not know much about policy making or even who controls Congress,
9Much of what follows in this section is derived, and sometimes borrowed, from an unpublished
manuscript by Coggins, Stimson, Atkinson, and Baumgartner titled “Beyond the Thermostat: A Theory
of Public Opinion Change.”
10This has not always been the case. In the 1950s the Democratic and Republican Parties were for all
intents and purposes identical. However, since the 1950s, the parties have increasingly become stronger and
have become more ideologically distinct (Aldrich 2011; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).
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it is safe assumption that most are aware of the president’s partisanship (Delli Carpini and
Keeter 1996). If we assume that citizens are aware of the president’s partisanship and that
they use party-based cues to make inferences about public policy, then party control of the
White House can serve as a primary source of information used to make inferences about
directions in public policy. When there is a Democrat in the White House we can assume
that citizens should expect policy to continuously move in a liberal direction and when
there is a Republican in the White House we can assume that they should expect policy to
continuously move in a conservative direction over time.
Under these assumptions, the preferences of citizens’ can behave thermostatically as
relative preferences change as a function of inferences of policy change, which are based
on party control of the White House. For example, when a Democrat is in the White House,
an individual can infer the implementation of more liberal policy throughout the presidency
and adjust his or her relative policy demand, resulting in changes in his or her preference
for less liberal policy over time.
This conception of public opinion change is one in which the typical citizen need not
pay much attention to politics, and thus fits with what political scientists have long known
about the American public: citizens do not pay attention to politics (outside of campaigns).
Thus the movers of public opinion here need not be astute observers of politics. Rather,
they need only possess the most basic of political information: the president’s partisanship.
4.3.3 Modelling Aggregate Partisan Preference Change by Party Control
Here I seek to model the aggregate dynamics of partisan opinion change in response to
party control of the White House. Assumptions previously made about the distribution and
fixed nature of Democratic and Republican partisans’ absolute preferences similarly apply
here. However, rather than model policy, we need to place some inferred policy position
based on party control of the presidency. For intuitive purposes assume that inferred policy
positions are 60 when a Democrat is in the White House and 40 when a Republican is in
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the White House on the same 0-100 scale used above and that everyone infers the same
policy position for each party.11 This places the inferred policy position as more extreme
than each party’s median absolute preference when each respective party is in control of
the White House.
Using these assumptions, let’s consider a scenario that starts with a Democratic pres-
ident at time t where the electorate’s inferred policy position is located at 60. This is
illustrated in the Panel (a) of Figure 4.3. Everyone with an absolute preference greater
than 60 holds a relative preference of more liberal policy, while everyone with an absolute
preferences less than 60 holds a relative preference of less liberal policy. Again, the use
of probability theory is useful here. Using probability theory, we can determine the pro-
portion of Democratic and Republican partisans with a relative preference for more liberal
policy. Within the set of Democratic partisans, 36 percent have a relative preference for
more liberal policy while the other 64 percent prefer less liberal policy. Only 15 percent
of Republicans prefer more liberal policy, while the remaining 85 percent of Republicans
prefer less liberal policy.
Next let’s consider what happens when party control of the White House changes from
Democratic to Republican. The inferred policy position then changes from 60 at time t to
40 at time t+1. The relative preference for each individual holding an absolute preference
between 40 and 60 then changes from a relative preference for less liberal policy to a
relative preference for more liberal policy. At t+1 the percentage of Republican partisans
preferring more liberal policy is 64 percent and while 36 percent prefer less liberal policy.
The aggregate relative preference of the Democratic Party in the electorate when policy is
located at 40 also changes, with 85 percent expressing a relative preference for more liberal
policy and the remaining 15 percent expressing a relative preference for less liberal policy.
11It is not necessary that everyone infer policy outputs to be at around 60 under Democratic presidents and
40 under Republican presidents. This inference can vary individually under the assumption that that these
inferences are 60 and 40 for a president of each party, respectively, on average.
42
(a)
(b)
Note: These figures show Democratic and Republican preferences in the electorate time t where is inferred
to be located at 60 when a Democrat is in the White House and time t+1 where policy is inferred to be
located at 40 when a Republican is in the White House. P ∗D is the central tendency of Democratic absolute
preferences, P ∗R is the central tendency of Republican absolute preferences, and P is policy. Figures not to
scale.
Figure 4.3: Party Control and Relative Preference Change from Time t to t+1.
Of interest are the dynamics associated with partisan opinion responsiveness to the
party of the president. In this example this is the change in the relative preferences of
Democrats and Republicans when party control changes from Democratic to Republican.
The change in aggregate relative preferences for more liberal policy from t to t+1 among
Democratic partisans is 36 percent to 85 percent, an increase of 49 percent. For Republican
partisans this change goes from 15 percent for more liberal policy to 64 percent, an increase
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of 49 percent. The relative preference for more liberal policy increases for both sets of
partisan identifiers, leading again to a similar prediction of imperfect parallelism over time
between Democrats and Republicans in the electorate.12
In reality it takes time for such drastic movement in policy to occur, reaching the as-
sumed inferred policy positions here. Rather this change is likely gradual, occurring over
multiple time periods. However, the changes illustrate why parallelism is to be expected be-
tween Democratic and Republican opinion over time with respect to the partisanship of the
president. The logics hold for the expectation of parallel publics. Assuming no change in
absolute preferences, the change in party control of the White House and policy inferences
that follow generates changes in relative preferences.
4.3.4 Parallelism Prevails
While the real political world is much more complex than these two illustrations of the
thermostatic model, the logic is applicable. Citizens can respond thermostatically to both
policy change and party control of the White House. And despite the aggregate absolute
preferences of Democrats and Republicans being on opposite sides of the ideological spec-
trum, the dynamics in aggregate relative preference change for Democrats and Republicans
in the electorate should be similar.
4.4 Partisan Opinion and the Economy
In addition to policy and partisanship of the president, the macroeconomy might also
affect what citizens want from government. Durr (1993) finds that when the economy is
robust, the public prefers more liberal policy (i.e. more government services). Conversely,
during periods of economic downturn, the public prefers more conservative policy. The
essence of the argument is that when economy is performing well, the public demands
more government services because the government coffers are, presumably, full. However,
12It is not necessarily the case that such changes in opinion happen following a change in the White House.
Knowing that a president of one party is in the White House, citizens can anticipate the implementation of
additional liberal or conservative policies over the course of a president’s term.
44
when times are tough, the public prefers the government to tighten its belt and not engage
in unnecessary or frivolous spending.
But this relationship is not so clear. It is not unreasonable to think that when the econ-
omy is struggling that the public prefer government to intervene in order to prevent further
economic decline or expand the social safety net, by passing policy that is generally con-
sidered to be interventionist and liberal.13 Likewise, when the economy is booming, the
public may prefer more laissez faire policy, which is generally associated with conser-
vatism (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002).
These conflicting predictions provide for no general expectation about how the public
responds to robust or weak economic conditions. However, the literature suggests more
specific responses to unemployment and inflation (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Alesina,
Roubini, and Cohen 1997; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Enns and Kellstedt
2008). While both Democrats and Republicans find these conditions undesirable, Demo-
cratic and Republican policy makers have differing preferences on which undesirable they
would have over the other. Democratic elite prefer lowering unemployment to lowering
inflation, whereas Republican elite prefer the opposite (Tufte 1978; Chappell and Keech
1986; Hibbs 1987; Keech 1995). It is not unreasonable to think that Democrats and Repub-
licans in the electorate share these same views with their respective co-partisan elite. Thus
we might expect that Democrats are more responsive to changes in unemployment whereas
Republicans are responsive to changes in inflation, ceteris paribus.
This leads to the following expectations. As unemployment increases, Democrats in
the electorate should indicate a preference for more liberal policy, demanding government
intervention to spur job creation or prevent further job loss. Likewise, Republicans in the
electorate should react more to changes in inflation than Democrats. As inflation increases,
Republicans should demand more conservative fiscal policy to combat inflation. However,
13Generally speaking, nearly any interventionist policy can be viewed as liberal.
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these tradeoffs can only be thought to be short-term forces, as unemployment and inflation
should equilibrate over time.
4.5 Research Design
Relative preferences can change with respect to policy, party control of the presidency,
and the economy. I use the partisan moods data for Democrats and Republicans presented
in the previous chapter to measure the the relative preferences of each respective party in
the electorate. There are the percentage of Democrats and Republicans in the electorate
preferring more liberal policy out of those who prefer more liberal anbd less liberal policy.
Thus, they are aggregated relative preferences for each party in the electorate. These data
are used as dependent variables in the analysis that follows. The independent variables are
described below.
Policy: Measuring the liberalism of public policy is not a straightforward task. In many
instances, scholars have used spending or budget outlays as proxies for public policy (Ura
and Ellis 2012; Wlezien 1995, 2004; see also Wlezien 1996). These proxies fit well with
the thermostatic model of opinion change. For instance, public preferences for education
spending fits neatly with education spending outlays. However, in most of these previous
studies, the relationship between opinion and policy are evaluated within a policy specific
domain. Thus it is easy to make the case that changes in policy specific opinion translate
into changes policy-specific spending. However, the relationship between general opinion
and all domestic spending is not specific enough to draw meaningful conclusions about the
relationship between opinion and policy.
Further, the use of spending data raises the question of how much the public knows
about government spending. Considering the literature on the political sophistication, or
lack thereof, of the American electorate (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini
and Keeter 1996), spending may not serve as the best proxy for public policy. If we as-
sume that the public is generally inattentive then a more simplistic, if not crude, measure
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Note: Data are Mayhew’s Laws coded for direction and detrended. Dashed vertical lines separate party
control of the presidency, denoted by D for Democratic control and by R for Republican control.
Figure 4.4: Policy Liberalism and Presidential Partisanship, 1951-2008
of public policy may be more appropriate. I take this latter approach.
To measure public policy I use Mayhew’s (1991) Important Laws coded for the liberal-
conservative direction of policy change. Mayhew’s Laws are pieces of legislation that were
considered important by observers at the time and ones that citizens should have been,
at the very least, slightly aware of. While citizens may not be aware of how much the
government is spending on healthcare or whether the government is spending more or less
that it was last year, citizens are likely to be aware of the passage of the Affordable Care
Act. An additional advantage of using Mayhew’s Laws is that it allows for laws passed that
are not captured through government spending. For example, budget outlays and spending
do not account for “hidden spending” through tax cuts even though citizens may be well
aware of the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 (but see Bartels 2005).
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) code these laws for their ideological content,
47
as most indicate a clear liberal or conservative shift in policy, and these data have recently
been updated by Bolstad (2012).14 Laws determined to be liberal are coded +1 while con-
servative laws are coded -1. Exceptionally important legislation is counted as double (i.e.
-2, +2). The value of these laws is summed for each year, yielding a measure of liberal
or conservative policy output annually. These annual scores can be added to the cumula-
tive score of Mayhew’s Laws to produce an overall cumulative laws index gauging how
liberal or conservative policy is in a given year (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002).
The liberal-conservative measure of Mayhew’s Laws shows a clear liberal trend over time
as these laws accumulate, as most landmark laws over the past few decades have increased
the size and scope of the federal government. Soroka and Wlezien (2010) suggest that
this liberal drift may be a result of constant political philosophies being applied to social
conditions rather than a true liberal movement. Consistent with Erikson, MacKuen, and
Stimson (2002), this linear trend is removed from the accumulated measure of Mayhew’s
Laws prior to analysis. These detrended data are displayed in Figure 4.4.
Party of the President: But, as outlined above, opinion may change thermostatically in
response to the party maintaining control of the White House. I include a dichotomous
variable coded 1 for Democratic presidencies and 0 for Republican presidencies as a mea-
sure of party control of the presidency. The party control of the White House over time can
be seen in Figure 4.4.
Economic Conditions: Last, macroeconomic conditions can move public sentiment. I
include the changes unemployment and the inflation rate to account for these factors. These
data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
14Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) eliminate laws dealing with foreign policy and defense policy,
as well as those with a more local impact than national. They code the content of these laws as whether or
not observers at the time saw the law as moving policy in a liberal or conservative direction.
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4.5.1 A Test for Partisan Thermostats
It is expected that Democrats and Republicans respond in a similar thermostatic fashion
to both policy and party control of the White House. Specifically, both groups of partisans
in the aggregate, are expected to respond negatively to policy change and the presidency.
When policy moves in the liberal direction, relative preferences should move in the conser-
vative direction, and vice versa. Similarly, relative preferences should become less liberal
during Democratic presidencies and more liberal under Republican presidencies. These ex-
pectations apply for both the Democratic and Republican Parties in the electorate. The coef-
ficients for both policy and presidential partisanship should be negative for both Democrats
and Republicans. Likewise, Democratic and Republican partisans should similarly respond
to economic conditions. The coefficients for inflation should be negative for both parties,
while the coefficients for unemployment should both be positive; however, it is expected
that Democrats are more sensitive to unemployment and Republicans to inflation.
To evaluate the relationship between partisan moods and policy, the presidency, and the
economy, I estimate two regression equations jointly within a Seemingly Unrelated Regres-
sion (SUR) model where the dependent variables are changes in Democratic and Repub-
lican Mood, respectively. The SUR accounts for the likely correlation of errors between
the two equations, producing more efficient estimates than would result from separate re-
gressions (Zellner 1962; Binkley and Nelson 1988). Additionally, a SUR setup allows for
easy cross-equation tests of equality to assess the similarity of regression coefficients across
models. A direct test of the similarity of coefficients between Democrats and Republicans
is necessary to assess the similarities or differences in causal dynamics.
I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate the SUR regression model testing the
influence of policy, party control, and economic conditions on Democratic and Republican
relative preferences.15 The first difference of each dependent variable is regressed on a
15I use a simple OLS model here because it follows the theoretical process, as noted by Soroka and Wlezien
(2010). A more sophisticated Error Correction Model (ECM) would imply rational anticipation of policy,
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Table 4.1: Partisan Mood Responsiveness to Policy, the Presidency, and Eco-
nomic Conditions, 1951-2008.
Variable ∆Democratic Mood ∆Republican Mood |Difference|
Yt−1 -0.28a -0.14a 0.14
(0.07) (0.06)
Policyt−1 -0.16a -0.00 0.16b
(0.06) (0.07)
Democratic Presidentt -0.55 -2.62a 2.07b
(0.64) (0.93)
Inflation Ratet -0.17 -0.46 0.29
(0.16) (0.23)
∆Unemploymentt 0.61a 1.06a 0.45
(0.34) (0.50)
Constant 19.24b 9.47b 9.77b
(4.55) (3.14)
R2 0.37 0.33
Note: N=57. ap ≤ 0.05, one-tailed test. bp ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test. The dependent variable is the first difference in
Democratic or Republican Mood from t− 1 to t. Standard errors are in parentheses.
lagged level of the dependent variable, the lagged level of policy, the dichotomous variable
for the partisanship of the president, the inflation rate, and the change in the unemployment
from t-1 to t. The lagged dependent variable of partisan mood introduces dynamics into the
model and controls for serial autocorrelation. The lagged level of policy ensures the causal
relationship between policy and opinion.
4.6 Evidence of Differential Thermostatic Responsiveness
The results in Table 4.1 present the influence of policy, party control, and economic
conditions on Democratic and Republican Mood. Column 1 reports the estimated coeffi-
cients for Democratic Mood, Column 2 for Republican Mood, and Column 3 reports the
absolute differences between the two for each model parameter. Tests of significance in
the first two columns are one-tailed at the 0.05 level for all independent variables. The dif-
ferences reported in Column 3 are tested for statistical significance at the 0.05 level using
two-tailed t-tests.
among other factors, by the electorate which I do not consider to be a reasonable theoretical expectation.
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The results indicate that Democratic and Republican Mood both respond thermostati-
cally. However, the thermostatic mechanism through which opinion changes differs. Demo-
cratic Mood is responsive to changes in public policy, whereas Republican Mood is re-
sponsive to party control of the White House. Column 1 shows the expected relationship
between Democratic mood and policy. The coefficient for lagged policy is negative and
significant, but small. For each additional liberal law passed—relative to trend of liberal
law accumulation—the demand for more liberal policy by Democratic partisans decreases
by about 0.16 units. While Democratic Mood is responsive to changes in policy, it is not
significant;y responsive to the partisanship of the president.
Column 2 in Table 4.1 shows that the significance of these effects is flipped for Repub-
licans, though Republican Mood still responds thermostatically. While Republican Mood
does not significantly respond to changes in public policy, Republican Mood responds sig-
nificantly to the partisanship of the president. For each year a Democrat is in the White
House, Republican Mood decreases by 2.62 units. The opposite would be true if a Re-
publican were in the White House. The relative preferences of Republicans move in the
conservative direction when a Democrat is in the White House and in the liberal direction
when a Republican is in the White House. The negative sign on this coefficient is indicative
of a thermostatic response to party control of the White House and is a strong indicator of
the effect of party control on the relative preferences of Republicans. The partisanship of
the president serves as a strong signal to Republicans in the electorate that policy is too
liberal for their tastes, resulting in a strong demand for more conservative policy. However,
they do not respond to real policy change.
The aforementioned effects, however, indicate whether or not the model parameters are
significant from zero. Of greater interest is whether or not the effects on Democratic Mood
are statistically different from those on Republican Mood. Column 3 of Table 4.1 reports
these differences. Of note are the significant differences between policy and party control
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of the White House on Democratic and Republican Mood. Comparing these differences in-
dicates further support for the differential thermostatic responsiveness between Democrats
and Republicans in the electorate. A difference of 0.16, while small, is significant for the
effect of policy on each party’s mood considering the range of the variable.16 The differ-
ence is more substantial for party control, where there is a significant difference of 2.07
units.
The controls for inflation and unemployment are not consistent with expectations. Nei-
ther Democratic or Republican Mood is significantly responsive to the inflation rate, though
the coefficient for each is in the expected negative direction. But the expected relationship
between changes in unemployment and the Moods of Democrats and Republicans is sig-
nificant. Further, the effect of changes in unemployment is larger on Republican mood
(1.06) than it is on Democratic mood (0.61), though the difference between the two is not
significant. As unemployment increases, both groups of partisans call for greater govern-
ment intervention to solve job crises. Both Republicans and Democrats are more sensitive
to unemployment than inflation.
The findings suggest that both Democratic and Republican opinion respond thermo-
statically. However, the suggested account is one of differential responsiveness. Democrats
appear to be responding to changes in public policy, but Republicans do not consider policy
outputs at all. Rather, Republicans use the partisanship of the president to make inferences
about public policy, irrespective of any actual policy change.
4.7 Conclusion
I set out to understand how Democrats and Republicans in the electorate respond to
the White House and changes in public policy. Applying the thermostatic model in two
different forms to Democrats and Republicans in the electorate, the models predicts that
16The range of Mayhew’s Laws coded for direction and detrended is -15 to 14.14. For comparison, the
untrended measure ranges from 0 to 125.
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both Democrats and Republicans in the electorate should respond thermostatically to pol-
icy change and party control of the White House. This application provides a theoretical
underpinning for what Page and Shapiro (1992) called “parallel publics” more than two
decades ago. While parallel publics were expected, there was no expectation for whether
each group would be responsive to both policy and party control, or one over the other. But
the results indicate that Democrats and Republicans respond through different thermostatic
mechanisms. Democrats are responsive to changes in public policy, while Republicans are
responsive to party control of the White House.
Partisan cues are a strong enough force to move public opinion, but not for everyone.
The differences in opinion responsiveness between Democrats and Republicans is indica-
tive of the different ways Democrats and Republicans evaluate the political environment.
While Democrats appear to track changes in public policy, Republicans do not appear to be
in-tune at all with the dynamics of political change. Rather, Republicans rely on partisan
cues through party control of the White House to make inferences about the direction of
public policy.
These results, while somewhat puzzling, raise questions that we can build on in future
research. First, why are Democrats responsive to policy but Republicans responsive to party
control? Second, can this explain the divergence of preferences observed in the partisan
Moods data since the early 90s? Last, these data may not be best suited to evaluate the
polarization of the parties in the electorate. In the discussion that concludes this chapter I
discuss these issues in more detail and provide some possible answers to these questions.
4.8 Discussion
The distinctive opinion responses between Democrats and Republicans in the electorate
raises a few issues worthy of further discussion. The first of these is how perceptions affect
the way Democrats and Republicans consider new public policy. It might be the case that
Democrats and Republicans in the electorate hold different perceptions about where policy
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lies along the ideological spectrum. Second, if we want to have anything meaningful to say
about mass polarization, the use of relative preferences may not be appropriate.
4.8.1 Partisan Media and Policy Misperception
For most of the twentieth century when American citizens received their news from the
three major news networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC, prominent national and regional news-
papers (e.g. The New York Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, etc.), news magazines
(e.g. Time and Newsweek), and wire services (Berry and Sobieraj 2014). One explanation
given for the finding of parallel publics in the electorate is that everyone responds similarly
to political stimuli because everyone receives the same information (Enns and Kellstedt
2008). During the era of a harmonious press, the reception of the same, centrist messages
results in nearly all citizens, including Democrats and Republicans, updating their politi-
cal attitudes similarly (Enns and Kellstedt 2008). Homogenous inputs led to homogenous
outputs.
But this has changed. While media through much of the twentieth century could be
considered “objective” journalism, there has been a movement back towards the partisan
press that was prevalent in the nineteenth century (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Jamieson, Cap-
pella, and Turow 1998). The development and rise of new media over the past twenty-five
or so years has resulted in more fragmented information environment, where partisan and
ideological outlets have proliferated. These outlets primary objective is to entertain and
persuade, proffering stories that may be contentious, filled with misinformation, and lead
to a more polarized democratic dialogue (Barker 2002).
The increase in availability of partisan media into the media market has given con-
sumers the opportunity to select sources of news that are consistent with their preferences
(Davis and Owen 1998). Accompanying the rise of new, partisan sources of the news has
been the decline in the more traditional outlets (i.e. network news, newspapers, etc.) (Berry
and Sobieraj 2014). Fewer citizens are now subscribing to newspapers and watching the
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nightly network newscasts.
In terms of shear size, both in sources and audience, conservative media has a clear
edge over liberal media. While MSNBC may rival Fox News as a television news source,
Fox News dominates the cable television ratings (Iyengar and Hahn 2009). Likewise, po-
litical talk radio is heavily conservative and has a large and loyal audience (Berry and
Sobieraj 2011). Additionally, while Republicans overwhelmingly choose Fox News and
right-wing talk radio as their sources of news, Democrats are not as tied to any particu-
lar left-wing media source. Democrats tend to prefer more moderate sources of the news
and have only recently begun to establish media preferences (Iyengar and Hahn 2009).17
Furthermore, conservative media tend to portray the mainstream media as liberal and un-
trustworthy (Jamieson 2008).
In today’s fragmented media environment where Republicans consume different media
than Democrats, Republicans and Democrats are not exposed to the same considerations.
Additionally, consumers of partisan media are exposed to misinformation. Misinformation
does not have to be deliberately false when primed with sarcasm and diatribe directed at op-
posing ideologies and groups, and often does not contain counterfactual assertions. Rather,
hosts of ideological media use sarcasm and diatribe directed at an ideological opposition
that leads audience members to draw inferences that fit their own predispositions and are
consistent with the ideological tone of the source by priming the audience with particular
considerations (Barker 2002). Even when sources of media are seeking to engage or en-
tertain an audience, as opposed to provide information, audience members draw inferences
which allow them to add to their information bank, even with pieces of misinformation
(Davis and Owen 1998).
17Additionally, until recently there were few sources of liberal news comparable to conservative news.
Even as the number of liberal news outlets have increased, recent Nielsen Ratings indicate that the size of the
audience of liberal news pales in comparison to the audience of conservative news.
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Objective information can have similar effects. Objective information can be extrap-
olated to fit into tight, ideological schema based on inferential reasoning, where citizens
fill in information gaps with views that fit their ideological disposition (Kuklinski, Quirk,
Jerit, Schwieder, and Rich 1997). The process often leads individuals to hold incorrect be-
liefs with confidence. Thus objective information can lead citizens to draw false inferences
through inferential reasoning. These inferences, however, tend to be consistent with an
individual’s predispositions and the ideological tone of the source (Lodge and Taber 2000).
How citizens draw inferences about information and express their attitudes towards public
policy, and politics in general, is largely determined by how they balance the weight of
considerations.
If partisan media only consistently expose consumers to one sided considerations, con-
sumers should express more consistent ideological preferences when subjected to partisan
media as opposed to mainstream media. Thus the change from subscribing to mainstream
media to partisan media, should relatively result in the expression of more ideologically
extreme preferences, ceteris paribus. As Zaller (1992) notes, the change in the balance of
accepted considerations, and the expressed preferences that go with them, is not sudden, but
gradual. Thus the frequent exposure to one sided ideological information can, over time,
result in an individual expressing preferences more in-line with that ideological disposition
as the intensity of the message increases.
Misinformation, inferential reasoning, and exposure to one-sided considerations can
have two effects: (1) misperception of public policy and (2) long term attitude change.
Let’s start with the first.
When exposed to partisan media, citizens may perceive policy as being more extreme
or moderate than it actually is. For example, when a Republican hears Rush Limbaugh
spouting off about the Affordable Care Act as functional socialism, he or she is likely to
perceive the Act as much more liberal than it is in real policy space. The difference between
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perceived policy and policy itself is perceptual error.18. If Democrats and Republicans
in the electorate hold different perceptions of where policy lies in ideological space, we
should not expect them to respond similarly to public policy enactments. This can affect an
individual’s relative preference, and thus a party in the electorate’s aggregate preference.
Thus measuring the distance between real policy and an assumed absolute preference is
problematic. This is especially true when using any measure of policy as an independent
variable coupled with relative preferences (as done here) because an assumption is made
that policy is viewed equally by both Democrats and Republicans. To solve this issue I
need to be able to control for the partisan media environment over time. To date, attempts to
resolve this issue have been unfruitful mostly due to data (un)availability. This is something
I hope to resolve in the future.
Partisan media can also affect long term attitude change. Opinion is not fickle. It
does not change dramatically easily, nor does it do so often; opinion changes slowly. It
ebbs and flows, reaching peaks and valleys. Movements from peaks to valleys takes many
years. These large, but gradual, changes are politically meaningful, and are a function of
much added up movement over time. Opinions evolve, they do not change over night.
When the public was exposed to a homogenous and harmonious media, attitudes trended
together. However, partisan media may result in the divergence of long term attitudes be-
tween Democrats and Republicans. It is possible that the changes in the media environment
are a cause, not necessarily the cause, of mass party polarization.
But recall that the Mood data employed here do not grasp long term attitudes. These
data gauge the relative preferences of the parties in the electorate, not absolute preferences.
Without a measure of absolute preferences there is little to say about polarization, let along
what causes it.
18These errors may cancel out in macro level opinion, but not at the meso level where Republican and
Democratic opinion and errors may be systematically biased
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4.8.2 On Absolute Preferences
While it is easy to see that the relative preferences of Democrats and Republicans have
deviated over the past twenty or so years (as observed in Chapter 2), it might be difficult
to put full meaning into this deviation without knowing about absolute preferences. While
changes in the demand for more or less liberal policy is similar between Democrats and
Republicans in the electorate over time, it is possible that changes in the preferred levels of
policy liberalism between the parties in the elctorate are not similar. Further, when political
scientists and pundits speak of mass party polarization, they are likely to be engaged in a
discussion about absolute preferences. If we wish to have a serious discussion about the
development of mass party polarization over time, modelling and measuring the absolute
preferences of mass parties can only help to settle dust on this debate.
Relative preferences are easy to measure, as was done with the partisan moods date
presented in Chapter 2. Questions that ask respondents if they want government to do
“less,” “more,” or the “same” regarding specific issues are easy for respondents to answer
genuinely. These types of questions ask about relative preferences. Gauging absolute pref-
erences through survey questions is much more difficult. Questions that ask a respondent
for their views on specific issues — such as abortion or gun control — are clear some
of the time, though becomes complex with more difficult issues and when comparing an-
swers over time. Some survey questions asks respondents to express their preferred level
of policy on a scale (i.e. 1-7 on the ANES), but it is not clear what each of those values
mean in policy space, let alone how they relate to the status quo. Additionally, express-
ing a preferred level on a specific policy is difficult for respondents to do. Issue are often
too complex for respondents to express a meaningful opinion about preferred levels policy
(Soroka and Wlezien 2010). These problems make it difficult to measure preferred levels
of policy liberalism over time. Since it is difficult to measure absolute preferences (P ∗), it
is difficult to produce reliable measures of it and be aware of its variation over time.
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I am in the process of trying to estimate measures of absolute preferences for the mass
parties in two ways. The first extracts information from the measures of Democratic and
Republican Mood to gain a sense of the possible values of absolute preferences at particular
points in time. The second involves solving the thermostatic model algebraically, for which
a measure of policy on the same scale of Mood is necessary. I briefly discuss the first
strategy below, as it is the only one I have spent meaningful time on.
The inflection points along the relative preferences line can inform us about absolute
preferences. Inflection points indicate a point at which preferences switch from a pref-
erence for more liberal policy to less liberal policy, or vice versa. Logically, preferences
change from “more” to “less” because the liberalism of policy has crossed the absolute
preference point. Therefore, the level of absolute preferences must lie between the relative
preferences at time t1 and t2 if and only if there is an inflection point at t2. The relative
preferences as indicated by mood at t1 and t2 thus provide a range of possible values for
absolute preferences at time t2. Thus each inflection point in the partisan mood series
provides some information about absolute preferences. We can then “reset” relative pref-
erences to be in accordance with the approximate location of absolute preferences. This is
certainly a hairy exercise and I am hopeful that something will come out of this endeavor.
With information about relative preferences and absolute preferences, it is also possible
to gauge at what level Democrats and Republicans perceive policy at various points in time.
This can help us to better understand how policy perceptions differ from real policy outputs
for both groups.
All that being said, relative preferences can be used to gauge how politicians respond to
demands for more or less liberal policy. This is the focus of the next chapter. It might also
be the case that there are no real absolute preferences because they are difficult to grasp,
not simply because of measurement issues but because citizens do not hold them. They can
easily tell us whether they want more or less of something, but not the amount. In this case,
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relative preferences may be the best we can do.
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5 PARTISAN REPRESENTATION
Normative theory tells us that elected representatives should represent the public. But
we can ask how should representatives represent in an empirical, democratic theory sense
where the question becomes, “whose views should be taken into account if representation
of public opinion is understood as a means toward insuring the representative’s reelection
success?” If that is the question, then answers such as “the public” or “the median voter”
are naı¨ve. A more sophisticated view arises from considering the representative’s own per-
ception of who are the keys to the representative’s future electoral success. Fenno (1978)
tells us that representatives see a reelection constituency which is a subset of the legal or ge-
ographical constituency. And for a general election at least, it is this reelection constituency
which should drive the electoral calculus.
In this article I ask who forms that reelection constituency and therefore whose views
should be honored to smooth the path to electoral success. Rather than evaluate the dyadic
relationship between a representative and his or her district, I take a collective approach to
representation by testing this relationship at the macro level. The answer in the main will
turn out to be a party’s fellow partisans. That is who should be represented if the represen-
tative seeks the most efficient translation of positions into eventual political support. This
suggests that prevailing accounts of macro level representation are only approximately cor-
rect in identifying voters as the key constituency. That seems to work, I suggest, because
“voters” happens to include the group which really matters, partisan voters. Herein I de-
velop a micro theory of representative behavior to produce a macro model of institutional
behavior from the micro understanding.
5.1 Public Opinion and Representation
The connection between policy and opinion has been tested extensively with studies
consistently showing that public preferences are translated into public policy (e.g. Erikson,
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1992; Soroka and
Wlezien 2010; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Wlezien 2004, 1996). Further, the
thermostatic relationship between policy and opinion often results in policymakers over-
responding to changes in opinion, yielding policy more liberal or conservative than de-
manded by the public (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2010;
Wlezien 1995, 1996).1 Representation appears to work well in American politics.
Additionally, the literature suggests a strong dyadic relationship between representa-
tives and constituents who share party identification (e.g. Bishin 2000; Bullock III and
Brady 1983; Clinton 2006; Fiorina 1974; Goff and Grier 1993; Griffin and Newman 2013;
Shapiro, Brady, Brody, and Ferejohn 1990; Wright 1989), suggesting that representing
these constituents is vital for future electoral success. However, partisan representation
may better work through collective representation (see Weissberg 1978), where parties
in Congress represent their co-partisans in the mass electorate as opposed to member’s
representing his or her constituents. With collective representation, citizens who do not
share their own representative’s partisanship can be represented by their own party in gov-
ernment. There is such evidence of congruence between party behavior and mass party
opinion from this collective perspective (Hurley 1989, 1991).
But representation is more than congruence between a representative’s political prefer-
ences and his or her constituency’s political opinion or a political party and its mass party’s
opinion. Representation, rather, implies responsiveness. The question asked then is, “when
opinion changes, do policymakers respond by adjusting their behavior to comport with
changes in opinion?” If policymakers are responsive to changes in the public’s preferences
1Alternatively, this could be though of as an over-correction to relative public preferences, which works
through a negative feedback mechanism in response to policy change.
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then this is dynamic representation (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995).2
However, when thinking about representation, the preferences of particular segments of
the population may receive greater attention than others from policymakers. In this case,
citizens who share partisanship with majority parties in Congress may receive greater rep-
resentation than citizens who are members of minority parties. Policymakers may not be
responding to changes in the public’s preferences, but the preferences of a smaller sub-
constituency. In the following section I propose a theory suggesting that representation
is highly partisan and driven by a representative’s goal of reelection, uncovering potential
inequalities in representation.3
5.2 A Dynamic Theory of Partisan Representation
Here I build a dynamic theory of partisan representation. I start with a micro model
of behavior considering a legislator’s goal of reelection and the voters most important to-
wards a legislator fulfilling that goal. I then consider what happens when aggregating over
politicians within a political institution to develop a macro model of institutional behavior.
5.2.1 Micro Level Behavior of Representatives
Mayhew (1974) asserts that representatives, specifically members of Congress, are
“single-minded seekers of reelection.” Fenno (1978) similarly argues that members have
three goals: (1) reelection, (2) power in Congress, and (3) good public policy. The second
and third are not possible without achieving the first. Reelection is important to members
seeking to remain in power and achieve influence in the policy process. Reelection, Fenno
argues, is cultivated by members through gaining the trust of voters in their district through
2Opinion change is of particular importance for the study of partisan representation. Democratic rep-
resentatives are likely to be ideologically congruent with Democrats in the electorate, as are Republican
representatives with Republicans in the electorate. But, as noted above, representation is more than ideo-
logical congruence (see Krehbiel 1993). Without the dynamics between opinion change and the response of
representatives, there is no sense of the representational process. Otherwise, representation could be nothing
more than coincidence.
3For additional literature on collective subconstituency representation and inequalities in representation,
see Bartels (2008), Enns and Wlezien (2011), and Gilens (2005).
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“home style.” Home style is based on how representatives view their districts, which are
composed of four nested constituencies. The most important of these nested constituencies
are the reelection and primary constituencies.4
When seeking reelection, a representative must ensure the support of enough voters to
feel electorally safe.5 If a representative wants to win reelection, he or she must maintain
the support necessary to achieve this goal, and it is assumed this support comes from the
reelection and primary constituencies.
The reelection constituency is assumed to contain a representative’s co-partisan and,
in many cases, independent voters in the electorate. The primary constituency should be
composed of only co-partisan voters. Thus in order to be electorally successful a repre-
sentative needs to win his or her own partisan voters. However, due to apportionment and
redistricting effects some, but not all, representatives need to win independent voters. No
representatives should need to win the voters of the opposing party since they are outside
of the reelection constituency.6 Therefore the opinion signal which representatives should
heed comes from this reelection constituency and primary constituency contained within.
The voters within these constituencies are those that are electorally salient.
The decisions representatives make should be based on how they think voters in their
4A subgroup within the primary constituency may be party activists. These active voters are more impor-
tant for a politician’s reelection effort and should receive more attention than inattentive voters (Saunders and
Abramowitz 2004; see also Key 1949). These voters are those who contribute money, volunteer, or provide
other resources to the representative’s reelection campaign efforts. Many of these voters may be within the
personal constituency as well. However, the personal constituency, the inner-most constituency, is one of
personal loyalty, not political loyalty; it does not need to be represented through policy activity.
5While a representative only needs 50 percent plus one votes to win reelection, a representative should
seek to win reelection by a safe margin in order to prevent an electoral “surprise” that could lead to an
unexpected loss. By maintaining a safe margin of support above the minimal fifty-percent plus one votes
threshold a politician could survive such an unexpected loss of support.
6Considering the apportionment of congressional districts, in addition to redistricting effects, many mem-
bers of the House of Representatives can win reelection with only the support of their own party. This makes
the support of independents trivial for many House members, and the support of partisans of the opposition
party unnecessary. However, some members of the House may need the support of independents to feel elec-
torally safe. In contrast, most senators should need the support of independents to succeed in their quest for
reelection. But like members of the House, members of the Senate should not need, or seek, the support of
voters of the opposition party.
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reelection constituency will affect their chances of winning future elections. When decid-
ing how to vote on a roll-call, assume that representatives make decisions based (1) on a
personal ideal point in an ideological policy space and (2) an expediency point, which is
the position a representative should take to maximize his or her chances of reelection in
the future. The expediency point is a position that seeks to maximize electoral safety by
satisfying the preferences of the reelection constituency.7 This process is assumed to occur
through rational anticipation (or rational expectations). Rational anticipation simply im-
plies that representatives believe current opinion will affect future elections and that they
use current opinion to inform their expediency point. Because current behavior is influ-
enced by prognostications about the future, behavior is anticipatory. Thus we should as-
sume that representatives are well in tune with the preferences of electorally salient voters
and, specifically, whether or not these preferences are trending in a liberal or conserva-
tive direction.8 Further, assume that members of the political class (e.g. politicians, party
leaders, journalists, etc.) within political parties are in consensual agreement about these
movements (see Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009). The opinion movements of each party’s
salient reelection constituency then informs representatives belonging to that respective
party in their decision making.
Thus representatives are aware of their reelection constituency’s trending attitudes, as-
sumed to mostly be their own partisans, and they anticipate the consequences these trends
will have in future elections. Therefore representatives should strategically alter their be-
havior to avoid electoral punishment to prevent being “out of step” with their reelection
7Stimson, Erikson, and MacKuen’s (1995) conception of dynamic representation is assumed to target the
expediency point at a representative’s legal or geographic constituency; at the macro level it targets the entire
U.S. voting public.
8Hill and Hurley (2003; see also Hill and Hurley 1999) argue that specific issues play an important role
in the link between citizens and representatives, particularly in partisan representation. But representatives
do not know which issues will be of importance in two, four, six, etc. years in the future, so specific issue
attitudes are not important for responsiveness in the context considered here. However, representatives should
be aware of more general liberal-conservative trends in opinion.
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constituency (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002).9 There are two effects of this strate-
gic adjustment: (1) the effect of policy change through electoral turnover is weakened
because representatives are less likely to be out of step with salient opinion and (2) policy
change is a function of rational anticipation.
5.2.2 Macro Level Institutional Behavior
The effect of rational anticipation is observed at the institutional level by aggregating
over representatives within a governing body. Assuming that representatives marginally
adjust their behavior as a function of agreed upon opinion signals, the result is a net, uni-
directional shift in policy liberalism as a function of these adjustments towards expedi-
ency.10 But these shifts are not uniform for the entire body. Shifts towards expediency come
through signals from the reelection constituency and these signals differ for the Democratic
and Republican Parties since each has a different, distinct reelection constituency. In the
aggregate partisan representation thus becomes collective, with each party in Congress fo-
cused on representing its reelection constituency. This reelection constituency is assumed
to composed of a party’s own members in the electorate and the requisite amount of in-
dependents necessary to win reelection safely.11 Which opinion signal is translated into
public policy is then dependent on party control. When Democrats are the majority party
in an elected institution, the Democratic electorally salient signal should carry through in
the policy making process; when Republicans are the majority party, the same should hold
true with respect to the salient Republican signal.
9If representatives do not change their behavior as opinion changes between elections they risk being “out
of step” on election day, leading to electoral loss. If all representatives do not adjust their behavior, then this
should result in more turnover on election day.
10For a formal representation of a similar process, see pp. 321-324 of Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson
(2002). The aggregation process modeled by Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) uses the median voter
rather than partisan voters, but produces a similar aggregation dynamics.
11We know that independents are not “independent” in their behavior. Independents who lean towards a
party behave very much like that party’s respective partisan identifiers (Keith, Magleby, Nelson, Orr, Westlye,
and Wolfinger 1992). This allows representatives to take positions more extreme than the average opinion of
all independents, which should appear relatively moderate since the more extreme preferences of Democratic
leaners and Republican leaners should cancel out.
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Because policy outcomes are largely a function of which party is in the majority, the
focus is on the majority party at the macro level, not Democrats and Republicans sepa-
rately. While the minority party should behave similarly to the majority party, the behavior
of the minority is largely unobservable at the macro level because the minority does not
heavily influence policy making in majoritarian institutions, such as the House of Repre-
sentatives.12 However, the same cannot be said for supermajoritarian institutions like the
U.S. Senate. While the majority party may have agenda control, the minority party can still
exert substantial influence on the policy process in the Senate.13
Public policy outcomes then should largely be a function of party control in elected,
majoritarian institutions. This is not only because of the preferences and behavior of the
majority party’s legislators but also because of the opinion of the majority party’s reelection
constituency.14 The opinion of the majority party’s reelection constituency informs repre-
sentatives when making public policy, not the opinion of the whole electorate. The rational
anticipation aspect of representation implies that opinion contemporaneously influences
12The majority party in the House of Representatives has agenda setting power and can restrict the rights of
minority party members. Therefore, policy outcomes should be reflective of the majority party’s preferences
and expediency points. Agenda setting by majority party leaders should lead to the introduction of bills
on the House floor that are not divisive within the majority party and will be beneficial in future elections.
Further, while the two primary theoretical approaches to congressional politics, conditional party government
(Aldrich 2011; Aldrich and Rhode 2000; Rohde 1991) and party cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins 2005,
1993), differ in their approaches to how Congress functions, they are in agreement in one major principal:
the majority party dominates.
13Because the Senate is a supermajoritarian institution the majority party does not have absolute control
over policy outcomes if the party does not have enough votes to invoke cloture. Further, any one member
of the Senate, regardless of majority or minority status, can potentially trump a supermajority by holding up
legislation and preventing consideration (Howard and Roberts 2015). There are other impediments to swift
responsiveness in the Senate. Most senators serve constituencies that are more populous than those of House
members which might result in a more diffuse, or less partisan, opinion signal. Additionally, senators serve
six years terms so they may not be as responsive to changes in opinion as their counterparts in the House until
their reelection cycle begins. Thus policy outcomes in the Senate should be less responsive to the majority
party’s primary and reelection constituencies than in the House.
14It is assumed that this is some combination of the majority party’s co-partisans and independents in the
electorate. Politicians must appeal to independent voters if the support of their own partisans is not enough to
win reelection safely. The partisan apportionment of districts, whether through redistricting or more general
demographic distribution, may make it unnecessary for some politicians to appeal to independents, but many
others won’t be able to ignore this salient group of voters. I am agnostic as to which group, co-partisans of
the majority party or independents, has more influence.
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policy.
Additionally, the ideological composition of congressional parties and houses of Congress
are affected by electoral turnover. The replacement of legislators in governing institutions
through elections changes the ideological makeup of the body as a whole and the parties
within. Accordingly, the agenda and policy outcomes are affected by electoral turnover.15
Lastly, it is assumed that policy is dynamic and for the most part incremental (Baum-
gartner and Jones 1993). Current policy should also be a function of previous policy.
Putting these pieces together the model of policy at the institutional level takes the
following form:
Policyt = αSalientOpiniont + βTurnovert−1 + γPolicyt−1
with the following expectations for model parameters:
α > 0
β > 0
γ > 0
The α parameter implies a positive relationship between the contemporaneous opinion
of the reelection constituency and policy. The elections parameter β implies that when
Democrats gain seats policy should become more liberal and when Republicans gain seats
policy should become more conservative, ceteris paribus.16 The parameter for previous
policy, γ, implies a positive relationship such that there should be a positive relationship
between one year’s policy and the next; policy change is incremental.17
15The agenda is also influenced by the problems and issues that randomly arise (Jones and Baumgartner
2005). However, assuming that Democrats and Republicans in government handle problems differently, the
manner in which the majority party handles issues on the agenda is dependent on the ideological composition
of the majority party.
16This assumes that Democrats are liberal and Republicans are conservative, though this has not always
been the case (APSA 1950).
17The theoretical model laid out here differs from the empirical model to be tested. The empirical model
to be estimated requires a specific modelling strategy (outlined below) that results in a negative prediction for
the lagged policy parameter as a function of model dynamics.
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5.3 Research Design
Representation can occur through both indirect and direct processes. Indirectly, repre-
sentation occurs through elections where electoral turnover is a function public opinion on
election day. The partisan composition of Congress then affects how liberal or conserva-
tive policy outcomes are. Directly, representation can occur even in the absence of electoral
turnover, where the liberalism of policy outputs is a function of public opinion through ra-
tional anticipation. These indirect and direct effects of the general electorate’s opinion on
policy liberalism have been demonstrated by Stimson et al (1995). I follow similar decision
strategies in research design to Stimson et al. to test the theory of partisan representation
in the U.S. Congress. This allows me to test the partisan representation thesis against the
original dynamic representation thesis in majoritarian and supermajoritarian institutions,
the House and Senate respectively.
The first step is to retest the original dynamic representation thesis using the general
electorate’s opinion. This sets the baseline expectation based on common conceptions
of representation where representation focuses on the electorate and comports well with
the median voter theorem. The second step is to replace the electorate’s opinion with
the opinion of the House or Senate majority party’s reelection constituency, depending
on which house of Congress is being analyzed. This assesses the opinion effects of the
electorally salient reelection constituency on policy making. The reelection constituency
is composed of two groups, the majority party’s fellow mass partisans and independents.
I test the effects of the majority party’s reelection constituency’s opinion first using only
the opinion of the in-party’s mass partisans, a subset of the reelection constituency, in a
reduced form model before adding in independent opinion in a fully specified model. I
then compare model fit statistics to evaluate which opinion signal has the greatest amount
of influence on ideological policy making activity in each chamber of Congress.
In what follows I describe a statistical model specification that closely represents the
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process of dynamic representation and the data used to test the effects of opinion on policy
making behavior.
5.3.1 A Test for Partisan Representation
It is important that the statistical test represent the mechanics of dynamic representation.
Since policy change is of interest the dependent variable is defined as a year-to-year first
difference (∆Y = Yt − Yt−1) and captures annual changes in the ideological activity of
legislators on the floor of each chamber of Congress. Also of importance is the rational
anticipation aspect of dynamic representation. This component suggests that legislators are
aware of opinion movements in real time and therefore should respond contemporaneously
with opinion change. Thus measures of opinion in the statistical model are also defined a
year-to-year first difference (∆X = Xt −Xt−1). Scholars analyzing similar relationships
between dynamic inputs and outputs have noted that short-term shocks, such as opinion
change, that disturb the level of policy liberalism are corrected towards an equilibrium
level over time (Jennings and John 2009). This process of dynamic representation fits
nearly perfectly with an error correction model (ECM) specification. The bivariate form of
the ECM takes the following form:
∆Yt = α0 + α1Yt−1 + β1∆Xt + β2Xt−1 + εt
There are two estimates for each independent variable in an ECM specification. The first
is a short-run effect, β1, which is defined as a year-to-year first difference of the variable
and corresponds well with the rational anticipation component for opinion. The second is
a long-run effect, β2, and is defined as a lagged value of an independent variable (Xt−1).
The long-run effect is used to calculate the long-run multiplier, which is the total effect
of a change in an independent variable on the dependent variable dispersed over time.18
18The data for the majority party’s co-partisan (in-party) opinion poses a unique problem in regard to
the differenced and lagged variables necessary for the error correction specification. Simple differencing and
lagging of in-party opinion can result in instances where the observed in-party opinion in a time period differs
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This cumulative, long-run multiplier effect decreases at the rate of the error correction
parameter, α1, which measures the rate at which shocks to the equilibrium are corrected
over time if this parameter is between 0 and -1 (DeBoef and Keele 2008).19 The error
correction parameter comes from a lagged value of the dependent variable (Yt−1).20
In the context of the thermostatic relationship between policy and opinion, the error
correction framework fits neatly with the equilibration effects of policy change as a func-
tion of opinion (Jennings and John 2009; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Erikson,
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002).21 Here I employ a quasi-ECM specification where mea-
sures of opinion receive the error correction treatment and have short-run and long-run
estimates.22 The indirect effects of opinion, electoral turnover and party control, are only
measured contemporaneously.23
from that of the opinion of the majority party. This occurs when the majority party in the House or Senate
changes. For example, following the 1994 Republican takeover of the House of Representatives, a simple
differencing of the data would result in the lagged value being Democratic opinion, and the differenced value
being the difference between Democratic opinion at t − 1 and Republican opinion at t. This does not sit
well on theoretical grounds, as the Republican conference in the House should not focus on the opinion
of Democrats over Republicans, nor should they be as readily informed about the opinion of Democrats
over Republicans in 1994. This distorts the connection between changes in policy activity and the relevant
reelection constituency. To fix this problem I use the appropriate lags and differences of the party in the
majority at t, ensuring that policy is a function of only the in-party in the electorate’s opinion in the statistical
models that follow.
19Long-run multipliers can be represented as the ratio of each variable’s long-run effect parameter β2
over the error correction parameter −αi for the dependent variable ( β2−α1 ). Standard errors of the long-run
multiplier can be computed using the Bewley transformation (DeBoef and Keele 2008).
20The significance of the error correction term, Yt−1, is essential to causal inference. If the coefficient
on this parameter is negative and significant, this is indicative of causality. Further, the coefficient on ∆X
indicates Granger causality. The lower the value of the error correction parameter, the faster the rate of
reequilibration.
21DeBoef and Keele (2008) suggest that the ECM is appropriate for stationary and non-stationary data. To
demonstrate the robustness of the results I include alternate model specifications in Appendix A.3.
22This approach differs from that taken by Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995;see also Erikson, MacK-
uen, and Stimson 2002). Rather than use the DYMIMIC setup I use linear regression through an ECM. Stim-
son, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995) note that their results do not differ from a linear approach. Kellstedt,
McAvoy, and Stimson (1995) further show that there is little difference between linear regression and the
DYMIMIC specification.
23The quasi-ECM approach is used because there are no theoretical expectations for cumulative effects
for electoral controls and majority party change. These effects should only be contemporaneous and affect
the level of policy activity liberalism. Further, considering the relatively small number of observations, the
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5.3.2 Measurement: Measuring Policy, Opinion, and Election Effects
The components of the model – policy, opinion, and electoral turnover – are familiar
concepts to most political scientists. However, with the exception of turnover, measuring
these concepts longitudinally is not a straightforward task. To measure policy, opinion,
and electoral turnover I follow similar decision rules as Stimson et al., deviating where
appropriate. The operationalization of these data is described below.
Policy Activity Liberalism in Congress: Of interest is the behavior of representatives
when creating public policy. Here I take a similar measurement strategy used by Stimson
et al. (1995; see also Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Grossback, Peterson, and
Stimson 2006). I do not measure policy from reading and interpreting the content or title
of proposed legislation, but by measuring the ideological content of legislation by judging
who votes for and against it. Observed are the decisions legislators make on the House
or Senate floor. The question asked is, “are representatives moving policy in a liberal or
conservative direction?” This can be observed by gauging which side, liberals or conserva-
tives, win in Congress, capturing all roll-call activity on the floor of the House and Senate.
The strategy follows the assumption that when liberals win policy is moved in the liberal
direction and when conservatives win policy is moved in the conservative direction. This
approach yields a measure of ideological policy making activity on the floor of each cham-
ber based on who is voting and how they vote.
The approach uses every roll-call vote in the House and Representatives and Senate
from 1951 through 2008. Using roll-calls, it can be determined which side, liberals or
conservatives, won on each ideological vote and by how much. To determine ideological
exclusion of the long-run effects of electoral turnover and party control keeps from extensively overfitting the
model. Employing a full error correction specification where electoral effects have both a short-run and long-
run effect does not lead to substantively different results. Specifications using the full ECM can be found in
Appendix A.3.
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votes I use Bailey’s (2011; 2007) ideal points for all members of Congress.24 Using each
legislator’s ideal point, the average ideal point for the “yea” and “nay” coalitions on each
vote are calculated. Only votes determined to be ideological are kept for analysis; non-
ideological votes are thrown out.25 Focusing on ideological votes rids of votes on which
there is substantial consensus, which are more often than not devoid of any real public
policy implications and by definition non-ideological (e.g. the naming of a post office).
There are two pieces of information that can be gleaned from each ideological vote: (1)
which side, liberal or conservative, won, and (2) by how much. Each piece of information is
then aggregated across each session of Congress, producing two measures of policy activity
liberalism. The first of these is simply the median size of the liberal coalition relative to the
conservative coalition on ideological roll-calls, measuring the net liberalism of a session of
Congress for each chamber. The second measure focuses on which side wins. This second
measure is simply the percentage of liberal wins on ideological votes. The product are
measures that not only gauge who wins and who loses, but by how much they win or lose.
The possible range of the data for both measures goes from 0 to 100 where higher values
are more liberal.
What emerges from the data are clear ideological trends in each chamber of Congress
24These ideal points are transformed to a 0-100 scale, where 0 anchors the conservative side of the ide-
ological continuum and 100 anchors the liberal side. Because I am comparing institutions, it is necessary
that the House and Senate maintain the same 0-100 scale and are anchored similarly. I anchor the conser-
vative and liberal sides, 0 and 100 respectively, by using the most conservative and liberal observations in
Bailey’s dataset. The most conservative (untransformed) ideal point is that of South Carolina Senator Strom
Thurmond in 1955 (2.94) and the most liberal (untransformed) ideal point is that of Michigan congressman
Lucien Nedzi (-2.67) in multiple years. An advantage to using the Bailey ideal points is that legislators’
ideal points can vary over time, fitting with the expectation that legislators may adjust their behavior as the
preferences of their electorate changes from year to year.
25The criterion for classifying a vote as ideological is that it must indicate greater ideological split than a
hypothetical party-line vote for the members of each Congress. This criterion was found to be, on average, a
difference of approximately 30 points between the average ideal point score on the 100 point scale of the yea
and nay coalitions. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002, pp. 295) describe the intuition as follows: “we
know we are observing a left-right cleavage when defection from party lines is itself along left-right lines,
conservative Democrats voting with Republicans, liberal Republicans voting with Democrats. Although the
party vote itself might be ideological, we can’t know that it is.”
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over time. Policy activity liberalism is high in the early 1960s, during the period of the
Great Society programs and Civil Rights, and reaches its height in the 110th Congress,
while conservatism peaks in the 105th Congress (mid-1990s) following the Republican
takeover of Congress in the 1994 midterm elections and early 2000s when the Republican
Party was in control of both chambers of Congress and the presidency. Policy activity,
unsurprisingly, is more liberal when Democrats are in the majority and more conservative
when Republicans are in the majority.26 Notice that both measures of liberalism trend
together. The individual series are displayed in Figure 5.1. The lines for liberal wins and
the median liberal coalition trend together indicating that there is a common component
between them, as should be expected. The differences in slopes between them capture an
idiosyncratic component. The measures of the median liberal coalition and net liberal wins
correlate at 0.96 in the House and 0.93 in the Senate. Because they tap the same concept,
the two measures of policy activity liberalism are averaged together to create a single times
series for each chamber of Congress.27
Opinion Liberalism: To measure opinion I use the partisan mood data presented in
Chapter 2. Recall that these data capture the demand for more or less liberal policy by
Democrats, Republicans, and independents in the electorate. I also include a measure of
the electorate’s mood based only on the questions used to create the partisan mood series.
While these data are useful for predicting what these difference groups in the electorate
what government from government, they need to be put into the proper context to match
up with the majority parties in the House and Senate for each year in the analysis. Using
26Because the dependent variable, policy activity liberalism, is expressed as a first difference, it is not
substantially influenced by party control other than in years in which there is a change in which party is in the
majority. As discussed below, I include controls for majority party change and the relative size of the majority
party to control for the changes in the dependent variable that are a function of majority party control.
27Alternatively, the two series were combined using principal components factor analysis. This method
does not lead to substantively different results. Stimson et al. (1995 combine the series through a DYMIMIC
regression. Averaging the two series together results in a similar dependent variable.
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Figure 5.1: Congressional Activity Liberalism, 1951-2008
the partisan mood data I create a measure of in-party mood where the majority party’s re-
spective partisan mood is used as in-party mood.28 Additionally, because the support of a
representative’s fellow partisans may not be enough to safely win reelection, the mood of
independents is also included in the model.29
Electoral Turnover and Majority Party Change: The Democratic percentages of mem-
bership in the House and Senate are included in the institution appropriate models and mea-
sure partisan turnover, the main carrier of the electoral message. This variable captures the
year-to-year change in Democratic and Republican membership in each chamber, grasping
28When Democrats are in power, Democratic mood is used as in-party opinion, and vice versa for Repub-
licans. The in-party’s opinion will vary between House and Senate analyses from year-to-year depending on
majority party control.
29From the beginning of the time series through the 1980s in-party mood moves in a similar pattern to
independent mood and shares common variance. In the data used for the House of Representatives the
correlation between in-party mood and independent mood is 0.50 (r2=0.25). For the Senate this correlation
is 0.61 (r2=0.37). This might raise concerns about multicollinearity. To address these concerns I create a
weighted measure of the reelection constituency’s opinion by combining the mood of the in-party with the
mood of independents. I estimate the mood of the reelection constituency by considering the composition
of voters a majority party incumbent needs to win in order to feel electorally safe. The description of this
weighting scheme and results using this weighted measure can be found in Appendix A.2. Additionally,
in Appendix A.3 I report the variance inflation factors for the models presented below and alterative model
specifications to address issues of multicollinearity.
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changes in House and Senate partisanship as a result of electoral turnover. It also helps to
control the level of policy activity liberalism as a function of the size of the majority party
in each chamber of Congress.
Additionally, majority party control is an important determinant of policy liberalism.
A dichotomous variable for party control is used to distinguish whether Democratic or
Republican mood is used as in-party opinion and is ill-suited for use here. Such a dichoto-
mous variable also induces high levels of multicollinearity into the statistical model.30 To
combat this issue I include a trichotomous variable coded 1 for years in which party control
has shifted from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party, 0 for years in which there
has been no change in majority party status, and -1 for years in which party control has
shifted from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. This variable accounts for large
changes in the dependent variable due to majority party change in the House or Senate.
5.4 The Evidence for Partisan Representation
Representation is important in all democratically elected institutions. Citizens elect the
members of these institutions to represent their interests in government. If representatives
are at all responsible to the voters that helped them win office, then representatives should
be most responsive to the opinions of those who are most responsible for their election in
the past and, more importantly, the future. Using annual data covering the time period 1951
through 2008, I estimate the models of representation for the House of Representatives and
Senate. I begin with the House of Representatives.
5.4.1 The House of Representatives
The House of Representatives is the closest governing body at the federal level to the
people and, arguably, should be the most representative governing institution. Given that
members of the House are up for reelection every two years, it is important that they do not
ignore the opinion of electorally salient voters.
30The correlation between a dichotomous variable indicating Democratic control of the House is correlated
with the House’s in-party mood at 0.83 (r2=0.69). For the Senate this correlation is 0.88 (r2=0.77).
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Table 5.1: Policy Responsiveness to Public, In-Party, and Independent Mood in the
U.S. House, 1951-2008.
Stimson et al. Retest Reduced Form Model Full Model
Constituency Electorate In-Partisans Reelection
Short-Run Effects
∆Moodt 0.74∗
(0.38)
∆In-Party Moodt 0.88∗ 0.83∗
(0.23) (0.32)
∆Independent Moodt 0.07
(0.32)
Long-Run Effects
Moodt−1 0.04
(0.24)
In-Party Moodt−1 0.36∗ 0.54∗
(0.14) (0.19)
Independent Moodt−1 -0.24
(0.17)
Long-Run Multipliers
Moodt−1 0.31
(0.23)
In-Party Moodt−1 1.13∗ 1.38∗
(0.08) (0.10)
Independent Moodt−1 -0.62†
(0.14)
House Controls
∆Percentage Democratict 0.60∗ 0.59∗ 0.56∗
(0.24) (0.21) (0.21)
∆Majority Partyt 14.39∗ 9.28∗ 8.25∗
(3.54) (3.56) (3.64)
Error Correction and Constant
Error Correction (Yt−1) -0.13∗ -0.32∗ -0.39∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10)
Constantt 5.60 -2.55 4.55
(12.29) (4.97) (7.38)
Model Fit and Diagnostics
Adj. R2 0.49 0.58 0.58
BIC 385.21 373.29 379.07
Dickey-Fuller Test (β) -1.13† -0.91† -0.97†
Note: N=57. ∗p ≤ 0.05, one-tailed test; †p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test. The dependent variable is the change in policy
activity liberalism from t− 1 to t. Standard errors are in parentheses. Long-run multipliers are calculated as the ratio of each
variable’s long-run effect parameter over the error correction parameter for the policy liberalism series (βi/− αi). Standard
errors of the long-run multiplier are computed using the Bewley transformation as reported by DeBoef and Keele (2008).
Dickey-Fuller tests assess the null hypothesis of a unit root process in each model’s residuals.
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I begin with a retest of Stimson et al.’s (1995) dynamic representation thesis which
tests the representation of the entire electorate using public policy mood. The results of
this retest (see Column 1, Table 5.1) indicate a significant contemporaneous effect of mood
on policy activity liberalism. For every one-unit change change in the liberal direction of
public opinion, policy liberalism increases 0.74 units. There are no significant effects of
mood in the long-run. It appears as though the public is well represented through rational
anticipation by the House of Representatives. However, this result may be spurious, driven
by some subgroup opinion.
The second model is a reduced form model analyzing the effect of the in-party’s mood
on policy activity liberalism (see Column 2, Table 5.1). The short-run parameter for in-
party mood indicates an effect of 0.88 units of policy liberalism for every one unit increase
in mood. This contemporaneous effect is significant, suggesting that the majority party
in the House rationally anticipates the opinion of its fellow partisans in the electorate,
affecting policy outputs in the House. The long-run multiplier for in-party mood is also
significant, indicating a 1.13 cumulative increase in policy liberalism in the future for every
one unit increase in in-party mood; this effect decays at the rate of the error correction
parameter (0.32). The median lag length of the error correction parameter indicates a that
half of this long-run effect is in place by the second year after a change in in-party mood
and that over 75 percent of the effect is in place by the fourth year. This suggests that
opinion change has a message that carries through time, affecting policy activity in future
time periods.
Estimating a full model using in-party and independent mood as opinion signals pro-
vides for more complete representation of the reelection constituency. The results (see Col-
umn 3, Table 5.1) indicate differences in the response of policy activity liberalism in the
House to changes in in-party mood and independent mood. The House contemporaneously
responds to changes in the House majority party’s co-partisan opinion, where a statistically
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significant one unit change in in-party mood leads to a 0.83 unit change in policy liberalism.
There is no significant contemporaneous effect for independent mood. The House majority
rationally anticipates the opinion of its fellow partisans in the electorate, while ignoring, or
at least not anticipating, the opinion of independents. The long-run multipliers for in-party
and independent mood, however, are both statistically significant, but oppositely signed.
The cumulative effect of in-party mood on policy activity liberalism is in the expected,
positive direction, leading to an increase of 1.38 units of policy liberalism over multiple
years for every one unit change in in-party mood. The effect for independent mood is in
the opposite direction, with a coefficient of -0.62 and is significant at the p ≤ 0.05 level
with a two-tailed test. These long-run effects decrease at the rate of the error correction
parameter (0.39) until they dissipate. The median lag length for associated with the error
correction parameter is two years after changes in in-party and independent mood. Over 75
percent of these long-run effects are in place within three years. The negative coefficient
should not be interpreted as a negative response by the House to independent opinion, but
as the amount of policy representation lost by independents due to the House majority party
representing its fellow partisans. Simply put, the majority party’s representation of its own
partisans in the electorate comes at the expense of other voters.
While the results suggest that in-party opinion affects changes in policy activity liber-
alism, it is also important to consider the indirect effects of representation that elections
and party control have on the level of policy activity liberalism. In all three of the mod-
els presented in Table 1 the effects for electoral turnover in the House and majority party
change are significant, in the same and expected direction, and are approximately the same
size. The more Democrats there are in the chamber, the more liberal the policy activity.
For every one percent increase in Democratic control (i.e. the replacement of four Republi-
can members by Democrats) policy activity liberalism increases approximately 0.60 units.
Likewise, when the House switches from Republican control to Democratic control, policy
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activity liberalism increases within a range of about 8 to 15 units across the three models.
Elections are important for changes in policy liberalism. As expected, policy activity tends
to be more liberal when there are more Democrats in the House and especially so when
Democrats are the majority party.
Of interest is whether it is the reelection constituency, in part or whole, or the electorate
that gets represented. Comparing effect sizes of the moods of the electorate, in-party, and
independents across models is not the best criterion on which to say one model is better
than the others. What we want to know is which measures of mood explain the most vari-
ance in policy activity liberalism. Using model selection criterion, such as adjusted R2
and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), it can be determined which model best predict
changes in policy activity liberalism.31 The Stimson et al. model has an adjustedR2 of 0.49
and a BIC of 385.21. The reduced form model and full model both have an adjusted R2
of 0.58, explaining 18 percent more of the variance in changes in policy activity liberalism
than the retest model. But while the reduced form models and full models have approx-
imately the same adjusted R2 values, the lower BIC values in the reduced form model
(373.29) indicate better model fit than the full model (379.07). Likewise, although the
models in Columns 2 and 3 have the same adjusted R2, the model using only in-party opin-
ion is more parsimonious than the model including independent opinion.32 What is clear
is that in-party mood is the best predictor of changes in policy activity liberalism among
the mood measures. Representation in the House is fueled by the majority party’s fellow
partisans and is the likely driver of the representation of the electorate. The retest of the
31The BIC is a model selection diagnostic used to assess model selection among models using the same
dependent variables. Lower values of the BIC indicate better model fit.
32Block exclusion (F) tests of the full model (Column 3, Table 1) excluding the two independent mood
parameters, a version of reduced form model, indicates that independent mood does not significantly add to
the full model (p =0.37). Excluding the two in-party mood parameters from the full model does significantly
affect the explained variance of the model (p <0.00). The full model performs no better than the reduced
form model, comparable to the latter F test. Further, F tests indicate that the short term parameter for in-party
mood is significantly different (p <0.05) from the short term parameter for independent mood. Likewise, the
long-run parameters for both variables are statistically significant (p <0.05) from each other.
80
Stimson et al. model works because the salient reelection signal is a part of the electorate’s
signal and they share some common variance in opinion dynamics.33
Policy activity in the House is most responsive to the opinion signal of citizens sharing
partisanship with the House majority party. Knowing that they are up for reelection every
two years, the members of the House collectively rationally anticipate the preferences of
their fellow partisans in the electorate. Further, partisan representation comes at the ex-
pense of independent voters and, ostensibly, citizens who are members of the out-party as
their preferences are not directly translated into policy.34 The representation of voters who
are not members of same party as the House majority occurs by happenstance due to sim-
ilar trends in opinion between groups. It is likely that representatives stay in contact with
their fellow partisan supporters and party activists relative to other voters. This contact
allows representatives to more easily grasp the opinion of fellow partisans in the electorate
and thus more easily translate these salient partisan signals into policy. Next, I analyze the
Senate.
5.4.2 The Senate
The Senate provides for an interesting case compared to the House. It has longer terms,
staggered elections, and was designed to act more deliberately than the House. Further, the
Senate should be more insulated from public influence than the House and is a superma-
joritarian institution. Incumbent senators are also not reelected at as high a rate as House
incumbents, and their bids for reelection are nearly always competitive (Jacobson 2012).
However, given the smaller incumbency advantage, it should be important that senators
respond to changes in opinion despite being more institutionally insulated from outside
33This is particularly true when the mood of the in-party moves in parallel with the mood of the electorate.
Representatives are paying attention to their fellow partisans in the electorate, but because everyone’s opinion
happens to be moving in parallel, it gives the appearance of full representation of the electorate.
34However, it is probably true that minority party legislators are behaving similarly to those in the majority
in representing their own partisan’s opinion in their decision making. But these actions are not translated into
policy due to their minority party status, ceteris paribus.
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influence than House members. As done with the House, I first analyze the effect of the
electorate’s opinion on policy activity liberalism, and then two models estimating the ef-
fects of the reelection constituency’s opinion.
The results of the dynamic representation retest (see Column 1, Table 5.2) in the Senate
show no effect of opinion on policy activity through rational anticipation, which is consis-
tent with Stimson et al.’s findings. There are significant effects over time as indicated by
the long-run multiplier associated with mood. The cumulative effect of mood on policy
activity liberalism is 0.76 units dispersed over time, decaying at the rate of the error cor-
rection parameter (0.42) which indicates a median lag length of two years. Over 75 percent
of the long-run effect is realized within three years following a change in mood. Opinion
matters, but it is not a fast mover of policy in the Senate.
Similar to the retest model for the electorate, the reduced form model indicates no
effect of rational anticipation for in-party mood, as indicated by the lack of significance
on the short-run parameter (see Column 2, Table 5.2). However, there does appear to be
representation in the long-run as the long-run multiplier is positive and significant. The
cumulative effect of in-party opinion on policy activity liberalism is 0.40 units over time,
decaying at the rate of the error correction parameter (0.47) until it has dissipated. The
median lag length associated with the error correction parameter is two years and 75 percent
of the long-run effect is realized within three years.
The results of the fully specified model for the Senate (see Column 3, Table 5.2) are
consistent with the first two models presented for the Senate. There are no significant
short-run effects of any opinion signal. However, the long-run multipliers associated with
in-party mood and independent mood are both significant but oppositely signed. The cu-
mulative effect of in-party mood is 0.68 units of policy liberalism while the cumulative
effect of independent mood is -0.66 units of policy liberalism, both decaying at the rate
of the error correction parameter (0.53). The model predicts that the median lag length
82
Table 5.2: Policy Responsiveness to Public, In-Party, and Independent Mood in the
U.S. Senate, 1951-2008.
Stimson et al. Retest Reduced Form Model Full Model
Constituency Electorate In-Partisans Reelection
Short-Run Effects
∆Moodt -0.38
(0.43)
∆In-Party Moodt -0.18 -0.21
(0.11) (0.41)
∆Independent Moodt 0.06
(0.40)
Long-Run Effects
Moodt−1 0.32
(0.22)
In-Party Moodt−1 0.19∗ 0.36∗
(0.11) (0.15)
Independent Moodt−1 -0.35
(0.22)
Long-Run Multipliers
Moodt−1 0.76∗
(0.24)
In-Party Moodt−1 0.40∗ 0.68∗
(0.09) (0.10)
Independent Moodt−1 -0.66†
(0.14)
Senate Controls
∆Percentage Democratict 0.74∗ 0.67∗ 0.68∗
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
∆Majority Partyt 7.67∗ 7.73∗ 7.19∗
(3.55) (3.56) (3.53)
Error Correction and Constant
Error Correction (Yt−1) -0.42∗ -0.47∗ -0.53∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12)
Constantt 3.82 13.56† 27.25†
(13.95) (5.65) (10.52)
Model Fit and Diagnostics
Adj. R2 0.45 0.47 0.47
BIC 399.76 398.14 403.20
Dickey-Fuller Test (β) -1.16† -1.10† -1.08†
Note: N=57. ∗p ≤ 0.05, one-tailed test; †p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test. The dependent variable is the change in policy
activity liberalism from t− 1 to t. Standard errors are in parentheses. Long-run multipliers are calculated as the ratio of each
variable’s long-run effect parameter over the error correction parameter for the policy liberalism series (βi/− αi). Standard
errors of the long-run multiplier are computed using the Bewley transformation as reported by DeBoef and Keele (2008).
Dickey-Fuller tests assess the null hypothesis of a unit root process in each model’s residuals.
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associated with the error correction parameter is one year and that over 75 percent of the
long-run effects accumulate within two years.
The lack of short-run effects and presence of long-run effects in these models provides
for an interesting puzzle. An explanation may be that senators are only in-tune with their
fellow partisans’ opinion during their reelection cycle (Kuklinski 1978). The two-thirds
of senators not up for reelection may drown out the short-run response of the third up for
reelection. But is merely speculation.
The controls for electoral turnover and changes in majority party control are significant
and consistent across all three models. For every Democratic senator replacing a Republi-
can senator, an increase of about 0.67 to 0.74 units of policy liberalism is expected. Like-
wise, when the majority party changes from Republican to Democratic there is an increase
of about 7 to 8 units of policy activity liberalism.
A model fit comparison of the three models presented indicates that in-party mood is
the best predictor of changes in policy activity liberalism, though not as conclusively as in
the models for the House. The adjusted R2 for the retest model is 0.45, while the reduced
form and full reelection constituency models both have an adjusted R2 of 0.47.35 The BIC
of the retest model is 399.76, and indicates better model fit than the full model which has
a BIC of 403.20. The BIC of the reduced form model (398.14) indicates that it performs
the best of the three, though there is no meaningful difference between the reduced form
model and the retest model. Collectively, the adjusted R2 and BIC values suggest that the
reduced form model performs the best, although the evidence is not conclusive.
The Senate does not rationally anticipate the opinion of the majority party’s reelec-
tion constituency or the entire electorate. However, there are significant reequilibration
35Block exclusion (F) tests of the full model (Column 3, Table 5.2) excluding the two independent mood
parameters, a version of reduced form model, indicates that independent mood does not significantly add to
the full model (p =0.27). Excluding the two in-party mood parameters from the full model does significantly
affect the explained variance of the model (p =0.05). The full model performs no better than the reduced
form model.
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effects of opinion over time. The changes in policy activity liberalism are best predicted by
the opinion of the majority party’s fellow partisans. Institutional constraints, term length,
and the electoral cycle may inhibit the Senate from responding as swiftly as the House to
changes in electorally salient opinion. Similarly, since the Senate is a supermajoritarian
institution, it may be difficult to pick up on purely partisan effects in representation. Unless
the majority party has enough members to consistently invoke cloture, it must cede some
ground to the minority party. Overall, the effects of opinion in the Senate are weak com-
pared to the House. Electoral effects appear to be the strongest connection between public
preferences and policy representation in the Senate.
5.5 Discussion
I set out to understand the relationship between partisanship and representation in a
dynamic context. Building on research on representation and the behavior of members of
Congress, I developed a theory of dynamic representation in which politicians represent the
voters most salient for their reelection, not their general electorates. I have demonstrated
that policy making responds over time to the constituency most important for the majority
party in government institutions, particularly the House of Representatives. Representation
in the House is partisan.
The findings have implications for the representation literature. The findings support
previous literature on dyadic approaches to partisan representation, while running contrary
to a long standing view about representation: that politicians and political parties cater to
the median voter (e.g. Downs 1957) or the public at-large. Elected politicians do not rep-
resent the electoral center in their policy making activities and it shows at the institutional
level. When this appears to be the case empirically (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson
2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Wlezien 2004), it is because fellow partisans
of the representatives within a policy making institution are driving the opinion signal. The
association between the electorate’s opinion and policy outcomes occurs by happenstance.
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Because group opinions moved in parallel through the 1980s (Page and Shapiro 1992), it
appeared as though policy was responsive to the public at-large at the macro level. How-
ever, as opinions have diverged over the past couple of decades, especially Democratic
and Republican opinion (e.g. Ura and Ellis 2012), we can now observe that not everyone
receives equal representation in a dynamic and collective context. If mass partisan polar-
ization continues to increase over time the inequalities observed in representation should
only increase.
Further, these findings explain the thermostatic nature of government response to opin-
ion. Seminal works on democratic responsiveness by Easton (1965) and Deutsch (1963),
as well as more recent work (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Pacheco 2013;
Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Wlezien 1996, 2004),
suggest a political system in which public opinion is an input that influences public policy
outputs. There is then, typically, negative feedback from the public in response to pol-
icy change. However, these empirical findings indicate that government outputs are often
over-responsive to the demands of public opinion, leading to policy that is more liberal or
conservative than demanded by the public. However, the observed over-response is largely
because scholars have been using the incorrect inputs into the systems model. Moderate
opinion signals could exaggerate the relationship between policy and general public opin-
ion. Policies that are too liberal or conservative for the electorate are too extreme not only
because the politicians hold more extreme preferences, but because the opinions to which
politicians are responding are also more extreme than the electorate’s. Changes in policy
reflect changes in more extreme (or less moderate) partisan opinion.
Last, there are normative consequences of partisan representation. The findings re-
ported here also indicate evidence of inequalities in representation.36 The representation
36See Enns and Wlezien (2011) for a recent edited volume on inequalities in representation.
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politicians give their fellow partisans comes at the expense of other constituents. Inde-
pendents and citizens identifying with the out-party appear to be left unrepresented in the
policy making process. Because the majority party has agenda setting power and can limit
the law-making power of the minority party, citizens represented by the party in the ma-
jority are more likely to see their opinions translated into policy than other citizens, and
the process is not merely a function of correlated preferences between representatives and
citizens who share partisanship. This is clearly evident in the House, though much less so
in the Senate where the minority party can use the filibuster to represent the interests of its
own partisans.
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6 CONCLUSION
Much work has been done on how the electorate’s opinion affects the macro political
system (e.g. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). However,
the most important influence on citizen’s political attitudes, party identification, is covered
up through aggregation. In this dissertation I have set out to find out more about these
effects.
I began by providing two ways to measure the opinion liberalism of the parties in the
electorate using longitudinal data. The first of these, symbolic ideology, indicated that the
electorate, and within it Republicans and independents, prefer to call themselves conser-
vatives. Democrats, on the other hand, prefer to be called liberals. These findings seem
valid on their face until we take a look at the operational ideology of these groups. The
electorate, by and large, prefers liberal policy, as do independents and Democrats. Further,
Republicans prefer liberal policy in roughly half of the years for which I have data. These
findings provide further evidence of the disconnect between operational and symbolic ide-
ology in the electorate, as recently studied in detail by (Ellis and Stimson 2012). However,
there is one group for which symbolic ideology and operational ideology are consistent,
Democratic identifiers. Perhaps it is the case that Democrats do not consider the word
“liberal” to be as dirty as do the remainder of American citizens.
The operational ideology presented in chapter 2 also indicates a divergence of Demo-
cratic and Republican opinion liberalism beginning in the early 1990s. Page and Shapiro
(1992) famously found that the opinion nearly all subgroup populations in the electorate,
including parties, move in parallel over time. However, right around the publication of
this work do we see the end of parallelism between Democratic and Republican opinion. I
should hesitate to call this divergence “polarization,” as the jury is out on whether this is a
true polarization of Democratic and Republican preferences, or simply a result of partisan
sorting in the electorate. Future work will address this point.
In the fourth chapter I demonstrated that Democrats and Republicans both thermostati-
cally respond to the changes in the political environment. However, the mechanism through
which these two sets of partisan identifiers respond is difference. Democrats are responsive
to changes in public policy, while Republicans are responsive to the party control of the
White House. This latter mechanism is likely driven by differing policy perceptions under
Democratic and Republican presidencies. For example, Republicans believe the Afford-
able Care Act (ACA) to be a very liberal policy, when in fact this policy was developed by
a Republican governor and contains many conservative principals, such as creating a “free
market” for heath insurance. The perception of the ACA as a liberal policy by Republicans
is likely a function of Barack Obama’s partisanship. We could further see such Republican
perceptions of policy looking at gun control, where many Republicans are actively worried
that President Obama is going to take their guns away. In reality, the policies created by
the Obama administration are nothing like the liberal, or even socialized, positions we hear
Republicans talk about. But it would be foolish to say that Republicans are not rational
in these opinions if they are based on their perceptions of policy. But, that does not mean
that these perceptions are not biased, they most certainly are. In the work that follows this
dissertation I plan to delve into this question of policy perception much deeper, particularly
as it related to the deviation of Democratic and Republican opinion liberalism over the past
twenty years. This includes trying to measure the absolute preferences of both parties in
the electorate.
Chapter 5 put Democratic and Republican opinion on the opposite side of the equa-
tion, asking how these opinions are represented in government and ultimately translated
into public policy. Building on work classical work on representation by Fenno (1978) and
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Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995), I proposed a theory in which politicians should
be most responsive to the opinion of their co-partisans in the electorate. Through an elec-
toral calculation, representatives can estimate how much of the vote they need to win and
where these votes will come from. Considering the apportionment and gerrymandering of
congressional districts, this should be a relatively easy calculation for most members of
Congress. While senators must make this calculus considering all voters within their state,
that many states are consistently Democratic or Republican similarly makes this calculation
simple. By and large, members of Congress need only to win over their co-partisans in the
electorate to win reelection. The results indicate that this is indeed the case for members of
the U.S. House of Representatives. Policy activity in the House is responsive to the House
majority’s opinion in the electorate at the expense of independents and, presumably, the
out-party. However, these results do not hold up in the Senate, where previous micro level
research has indicated evidence of partisan representation. The results add further to the
growing literature on inequalities in representation, are are yet another strike against the
median voter theorem (Downs 1957). Additionally, the results suggest that the electorate
at-large looks like it is get getting represented (e.g. Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995)
because partisan opinions tended to trend together for much of the twentieth century. How-
ever, the deviation in opinion has uncovered that this is merely coincidence, that politicians
are most responsive to the voters they can count on for reelection, their fellow partisans in
the electorate.
While the findings presented in this dissertation can inform us about the effects of
opinion beneath the surface of aggregation, there is certainly more work to be done. First,
as I have suggested above, the investigation of the deviation in partisan opinion is on this
list. Is this divergence simply a part of the sorting story, or is it a true polarization of
attitudes. My inclination is that it is a little bit of both, and something more that has not
received much attention until recently: differing perceptions of policy. If Democrats and
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Republicans perceive policy differently, regardless of the realities of public policy, then
their demands for more or less liberal policy will not move in tandem. I discussed this at
length at the end of Chapter 3, so I hesitate to say much more here. In the era of traditional
media, it was not surprising that Democratic and Republican opinion moved in tandem, as
both groups were receiving their news from the same nightly newscasts and national and
regional newspapers. However, the rise of a more fragmented media environment may have
changed this at the margins, resulting amplified divergence of attitudes when aggregated.
That this trend began around the time of the rise in talk radio and has only gotten stronger
with the rise of Fox News, MSNBC, and the Internet provides a place to begin investigation.
The second extension of this project entails a new dataset, building on recent work by
Jane Green and Will Jennings (2012) regarding macro competence. Macro competence
gauges the public assessments of the political parties in government. The plan going for-
ward is to extend their work by breaking down these aggregate measures of competence by
party identification, generating measures that capture partisan assessments of the Demo-
cratic and Republican parties in government. With these data I plan to look deeper into
the issue of mass party polarization and how partisan attitudes affect the macro political
system.1
1Will Jennings has shared the Macrocompetence database so I can easily identify which questions he used
in compiling the data that goes into the measure.
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XA APPENDI
A APPENDIX
A.1 Appendix 1: Operational Ideology in the GSS
This measure of liberalism is derived from 10 questions asked in the General Social Survey
consistently since 1973. These questions deal with spending priorities of the federal gov-
ernment and concern economic and scope of government issues. When taken together these
questions conceptualize what the role and scope of government should be. The stem of the
questions and issues addressed are as follows:1
We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved
easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and for each
one I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re spending too much money
on it, too little money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much
money, too little money, or about the right amount on (The military, armaments
and defense, Foreign aid, solving the problems of big cities, Halting the rising
crime rate, Dealing with drug addiction, Improving the Nation’s education system,
Improving and protecting the environment, Welfare, Improving and protecting the
nation’s health, Improving the conditions of Blacks)?
All questions with the exception of “military, armaments, and defense” were scored as 1 for
“too little spending” and -1 for “too much spending.” The “military, armaments, and defense”
question was coded in reverse. “Don’t know,” “About the right amount of spending,” and
“refused to answer” responses were scored as 0. The individual-level measure of preferences
on this dimension is a simple summation of scores for each of the 10 questions, multiplied
1Much of this section is borrowed directly from Ura and Ellis (2008).
by 5 and added by 50 to create a scale that goes from 0 to 100 (individual-level factor scores
correlate at 0.89 with the simple additive scales). Preferences for an 11th spending issue,
spending on space exploration, did not load on a single factor with the other 10 items and is
thus excluded from the measure.
A.2 Appendix II: Weighted Reelection Constituency Opinion for Ch. 4
An alternative approach to gauging the representation of the reelection constituency is to
create a single measure of opinion that captures the opinion of the reelection constituency by
combining and weighting in-party mood and independent mood.2 Rather than use factor anal-
ysis to determine the weight, I estimate the mood of the reelection constituency by considering
the composition of voters a majority party incumbent needs to win in order to feel electorally
safe. This always includes a representative’s fellow partisans and frequently includes some
requisite amount of independents. This constructed measure is based on an estimate of the
amount of partisans that make up the proportion of the vote an incumbent needs to win reelec-
tion safely. When an incumbent cannot win with only the support of his or her own partisans
the remaining weight is composed of independents. The weights of this measure approximate
the average partisan advantage within each district or state for majority party incumbents.
The first step requires an assumption about what percentage of the vote an incumbent mem-
ber of Congress aims for to feel electorally safe. This percentage is assumed to be 55 percent of
the vote. This is an arbitrary assumption and I do not suggest that this is the percentage of the
vote members of Congress seek to maximize. In reality, there is a strategic tradeoff represen-
tatives make based on a variety of factors, including whether or not they seek to represent their
partisan base or a broader electoral coalition. However, the theory predicts that these members
will lean more towards representing their partisan base. Increasing or decreasing the size of
this total vote percentage within reasonable margins does not significantly change the results.
The next step is to determine how much of this 55 percent is composed of the average
2This approach loses the ability to pick up on the partisan nature of representation. However, it still identifies the
broadest constituency that should matter for a representative’s reelection.
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majority party incumbent’s own partisans. To do so I find how much more partisan the average
majority party controlled district or state is than the national average of partisan identifiers.
This difference is then added to yearly averages of party identification at the national level
which come from the Gallup Organization.3 To determine how much more partisan the average
majority party member’s district or state is above the national average I use the Cook Political
Report’s Partisan Voting Index (PVI). The PVI is only available for Congressional districts
starting with the 1998 midterm elections and for states with the 1994 elections. I use only
the 2008 PVI to develop weights for the entire time series, 1951 through 2008.4 In 2008
the average advantage in the House was 14.39 percent for Democrats and 11.24 percent for
Republicans. In the Senate and advantage was 7.84 percent for Democrats and 13.14 percent
for Republicans. The equation for estimating the partisan advantage is as follows:
P¯ jt = N
j
t + A
j
where P¯ jt is the average of district or state partisanship for the majority party j in year t, N
j
t
is the majority party’s national partisanship, and Aj is the majority party’s electoral advantage,
which is assumed to be constant over time. To check the reliability of this estimate I check my
estimates with the other available years of the PVI. Comparisons indicate that the weights are
more conservative estimates of mean district partisanship. Any potential bias appears underes-
timate the size of the partisan advantage.
To determine the weight of in-party mood the proportion of mean district or state parti-
sanship for every year in the analysis is then determined by dividing this number by 55, the
assumed “safety” threshold. The weight for the in-party is calculated as follows:
W jt =
P¯ jt
55
3These data can be seen here: http://www.people-press.org/2012/06/01/trend-in-party-identification-1939-2012/
4While this is not ideal, there are many limitations to devising measures of district partisanship over time that in-
cludes independents. For example, district partisanship data developed by Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman (2008)
does not include independent identifiers. Even after making assumptions about the distribution of independents
within district using these data, district partisanship scores are not comparable across decades.
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where W jt is the weight for the majority party j in year t. If this proportion is less than 1 then
the remaining weight is given to independents. The weight for independents, W It , is simply 1
minus the in-party weight (1 - W jt ). 5 The result is a proportion of how much of the necessary
vote to feel electorally safe if made up by an incumbent’s fellow partisans and how much is
made up of independents in each year.
These weights for the in-party and independents are then multiplied by their respective
moods. The weighted measures of opinion are then added together to get the mood of the
electorally salient reelection constituency. The equation for creating this estimate is as follows:
MSt = (W
j
t ∗M jt ) + (W It ∗M It )
where MSt is the weighted measure of salient mood in year t. This is a product of multiplying
the weight of in-party partisanship, W jt , by in-party mood, M
j
t , and adding this to the weighted
measure of independent mood, which is computed by multiplying the weight of independents,
W It by independent mood M
I
t .
The first model presented analyzes the effect of the House majority’s reelection constituency’s
opinion on policy activity liberalism, while the second model analyzes this relationship for the
Senate majority’s reelection constituency.
A.2.1 The House of Representatives
The influence of the reelection constituency’s opinion on policy making in the House of
Representatives is clear (see Column 1, Table A.1). The coefficient on the short-run param-
eter for reelection constituency mood is significant and positive, as expected, where there is
nearly a one to one unit correspondence between changes in opinion and policy liberalism.
Specifically, a one unit change in reelection constituency mood results in a 0.92 unit change
in policy liberalism, suggesting that the House rationally anticipates changes in public opinion
of electorally salient voters. Likewise, the long-run multiplier for this parameter indicates a
cumulative effect of 1.17 units of policy liberalism in the future for every one unit change in
5There are no instances in which majority party partisans and independents do not make up fifty-five percent of the
mean constituency. There is no need to include the out-party in this measure.
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Table A.1: Policy Responsiveness to Reelection
Constituency Mood in the U.S. House and Senate,
1951-2008.
House Senate
Short-Run Effects
∆Reelct. Const. Moodt 0.93∗ -0.16
(0.25) (0.32)
Long-Run Effects
Reelct. Const. Moodt−1 0.32∗ 0.20
(0.14) (0.13)
Long-Run Multipliers
Reelct. Const. Moodt−1 1.22∗ 0.44∗
(0.09) (0.11)
Chamber Controls
∆Percentage Democratict−1 0.60∗ 0.70∗
(0.22) (0.33)
∆Majority Party 10.31∗ 6.54∗
(3.55) (3.70)
Error Correction and Constant
Error Correction (Yt−1) -0.26∗ -0.47∗
(0.08) (0.11)
Constantt -3.99 12.52
(5.92) (6.31)
Model Fit and Diagnostics
Adj. R2 0.57 0.46
BIC 374.89 398.84
Dickey-Fuller Test (β) -1.09† -1.11 †
Note: N=57. ∗p ≤ 0.05, one-tailed test; †p ≤ 0.05,
two-tailed test. The dependent variable is the change
in policy activity liberalism from t − 1 to t. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Long-run multipliers can be
represented as the ratio of each variable’s long-run ef-
fect parameter over the error correction parameter for
each policy liberalism series (βi/−αi). Standard errors
of the long-run multiplier are computed using the Be-
wley transformation as reported by DeBoef and Keele
(2008). Dickey-Fuller tests assess the null hypothesis
of a unit root process in each model’s residuals.
reelection constituency mood. Again, this suggests that House members not only rationally
anticipate the opinion of electorally salient voters and this opinion signal carries on through
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time, dissipating at the rate of the error correction parameter. The median lag length for the
model is three years and 75 percent of the effect accumulates after five years.
The effect of elections is significant. When four Republican members of the House are
replaced by four Democrats we can expect 0.58 increase in policy activity liberalism. Likewise,
a majority party switch from Republican control to Democratic control results in an increase
of approximately 10 units of policy liberalism.
While these results are consistent with those found in Table 5.1, it is worth noting that this
model explains one percent less of the variance in the dependent variable (as indicated by the
adjusted R2) than the model presented in Column 2, Table 5.1, which only uses the mood of
the in-party. Additionally, the BIC in the model presented in Column 2, Table 5.1 (373.29) is
slightly better than the BIC for the model presented here (374.89), though this difference is not
meaningful.
A.2.2 The Senate
Consistent with the findings presented for the Senate above, there is no significant effect
for short-run effects of the reelection constituency’s mood on policy making (see Column 2,
Table A.1). However, the long-run multiplier for reelection constituency mood is significant,
indicating a cumulative increase of 0.62 units of policy liberalism for every one unit increase
in this electorally salient opinion. Half of this effect is realized after two years, and 75 percent
of the effect is realized within three years. Again, the lack of short-run effects coupled with
a significant long-run multiplier could be due to the electoral cycles of the Senate. Controls
for the partisan makeup of the Senate and changes in the majority party are both statistically
significant and consistent across the models presented in Table 5.2. The findings here further
indicate a lack of rational anticipation in the Senate.
The adjusted R2 and BIC values for this model suggest that it performs no better or worse
than the models presented in Table 5.2. The difference in the adjusted R2s is only one percent.
The BIC, 398.84, is within one point of the BIC values associated with the models presented
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in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5.2 and within five points of the model presented in Column 3.
A.3 Appendix III: Supplemental Models and Diagnostics to Ch. 4
Readers may have questions about the possible influence of multicollinearity or if the re-
sults are robust to alternate model specifications. I address these concerns below.
A.3.1 Assessing Multicollinearity
Here I present the variance inflation factors (VIF) associated with the models presented in
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 in the main text to assess potential problems of multicollinearity. VIFs are an
indicator of multicollinearity, though not a formal test. A VIF measures how much a predictor’s
standard error increases due to correlation with other predictors. When there is no correlation
with other predictors a VIF has a value of one; higher values are indicative of collinearity with
other predictors. There are several rules of thumb in regard to what size of VIF should provide
concern for excessive multicollinearity. The most conservative rule suggests that a value of 4
indicates excessive multicollinearity, while others suggest values of 10, 20, and higher. I leave
it up to the reader to choose their own rule.
Table A.2 presents the VIFs associated with the models for the House of Representatives
presented in Table 5.1 in the text, Table A.3 does so for the models for the Senate presented in
Table 5.2. There are no VIFs for long-run multipliers since these come from hand calculations.
Of concern are the full models due to shared variance between in-party mood and independent
mood (House: r2 = 0.25; Senate: r2 = 0.37). The only VIF that may cause concern is for
the long-run effect of in-party mood in Table 5.1. A model using only the contemporaneous,
differenced independent variables for opinion is included below (see Table A.7) and reports
similar results to those presented in Table 5.1. Possible multicollinearity issues do not appear
to affect the short-run rational anticipation effects, which are of primary interest. Further, as
indicated in the main text, the full models using both in-party mood and independent mood as
predictors of policy activity liberalism perform no better than the reduced form models only
using in-party mood.
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Table A.2: Variance Inflation Factors for Models in Table 5.1.
Replication Reduced Form Model Full Model
Constituency Electorate In-Partisans Reelection
Long-Run Effects
Moodt−1 1.46
In-Party Moodt−1 3.46 6.61
Independent Moodt−1 2.11
Short-Run Effects
∆Moodt 1.12
∆In-Party Moodt 1.10 2.08
∆Independent Moodt 2.29
House Controls
∆Percentage Democratic 1.35 1.34 1.35
∆Majority Partyt 1.36 1.69 1.78
Error Correction
Error Correction (Yt−1) 1.31 3.03 3.99
Other
Mean VIF 1.32 2.12 2.89
Table A.3: Variance Inflation Factors for Models in Table 5.2.
Replication Reduced Form Model Full Model
Constituency Electorate In-Partisans Reelection
Long-Run Effects
Moodt−1 1.38
In-Party Moodt−1 1.81 3.55
Independent Moodt−1 2.34
Short-Run Effects
∆Moodt 1.11
∆In-Party Moodt 1.17 2.25
∆Independent Moodt 2.26
Senate Controls
∆Percentage Democratic 1.60 1.60 1.63
∆Majority Partyt 1.59 1.64 1.64
Error Correction
Error Correction (Yt−1) 1.20 1.57 1.83
Other
Mean VIF 1.38 1.56 2.21
A.3.2 Alternate Model Specifications
In this section I present additional model specifications to those presented in the text. First
I present models for the House and Senate where the relevant opinion signal is independent
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mood (see Table A.4). Briefly, this model is similar to the replication model where the relevant
opinion signal (public policy mood) comes from the electorate. In both models the opinion
signal comes from the center of the electorate. There are significant effects of independent
opinion in the House, but not in the Senate. These effects in the House are smaller than those
for mood in Column 1, Table 5.1 and for in-party mood in Column 2, Table 5.1. Further,
a comparison of adjusted R2 and BIC values indicates that these models using independent
mood perform worse than the respective House and Senate presented in Tables 1 and 2.
The remaining tables are alternate model specifications from those presented for the House
and Senate in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Table A.5 contains the full ECM specification for the House
and Table A.6 contains the full ECM specification for the Senate. The results do not substan-
tively differ from those presented in the main text.
Table A.7 presents model of differences for the House, excluding the lagged values for
the opinion signals; Table A.8 presents similar models for the Senate. The dependent variable
remains a first difference of policy activity liberalism. Every independent variable is measured
as a first difference with the exception of the variable capturing majority party change. In
effect, these models capture only the effects of rational anticipation of relevant opinion signals.
The results are consistent with those presented in the main text.
Last, Tables A.9 and A.10 present simplified linear models for the House and Senate, re-
spectively. Here the dependent variable is the level of policy activity liberalism for year t. A
lagged value of the dependent variable is included to control for serial autocorrelation. Un-
like the error correction specifications above, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable
should be positively associated with the dependent variable. The opinion variables–mood, in-
party mood, and independent mood–are measured as lagged values at t − 1, insuring proper
causal ordering. Control variables for the Democratic percentage of the chamber and a change
in majority party control are measured contemporaneously at time t. This is the most simplified
model of the relationship between policy and opinion. The results lead to similar substantive
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results as those reported in the main text. The strongest opinion signal comes from the majority
party’s fellow partisans.
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Table A.4: Policy Responsiveness to Independent
Mood in the U.S. House and Senate, 1951-2008.
House Senate
Short-Run Effects
∆Independent Moodt 0.44∗ -0.25
(0.25) (0.29)
Long-Run Effects
Independent Moodt−1 0.07 0.02
(0.14) (0.06)
Long-Run Multipliers
Independent Moodt−1 0.58∗ 0.05
(0.14) (0.16)
Chamber Controls
∆Percentage Democratict−1 0.64∗ 0.80∗
(0.24) (0.34)
∆Majority Party 13.48∗ 8.23∗
(3.58) (3.63)
Error Correction and Constant
Error Correction (Yt−1) -0.12∗ -0.38∗
(0.06) (0.10)
Constantt 3.60 18.64
(8.26) (10.22)
Model Fit and Diagnostics
Adj. R2 0.48 0.43
BIC 386.13 402.24
Dickey-Fuller Test (β) -1.13† -1.17 †
Note: N=57. ∗p ≤ 0.05, one-tailed test; †p ≤ 0.05,
two-tailed test. The dependent variable is the change
in policy activity liberalism from t − 1 to t. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Long-run multipliers can be
represented as the ratio of each variable’s long-run ef-
fect parameter over the error correction parameter for
each policy liberalism series (βi/−αi). Standard errors
of the long-run multiplier are computed using the Be-
wley transformation as reported by DeBoef and Keele
(2008). Dickey-Fuller tests assess the null hypothesis
of a unit root process in each model’s residuals.
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Table A.5: Full ECM of Table 5.1: Policy Responsiveness to Public,
In-Party, and Independent Mood in the U.S. House, 1951-2008.
Replication In-Partisans Only Full Model
Short-Run Effects
∆Moodt 0.87∗
(0.11)
∆In-Party Moodt 0.90∗ 0.82∗
(0.23) (0.32)
∆Independent Moodt 0.12
(0.33)
∆Percentage Democratict 0.73∗ 0.71∗ 0.66∗
(0.26) (0.23) (0.24)
Long-Run Effects
Moodt−1 0.08
(0.24)
In-Party Moodt−1 0.38∗ 0.53∗
(0.14) (0.19)
Independent Moodt−1 -0.18
(0.18)
Percentage Democratict−1 0.30 0.27 0.21∗
(0.23) (0.20) (0.22)
Long-Run Multipliers
Moodt−1 0.33
(0.23)
In-Party Moodt−1 0.88∗ 1.15∗
(0.30) (0.14)
Independent Moodt−1 -0.39†
(0.17)
Percentage Democratict−1 1.25∗ 0.63∗ 0.46∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.19)
House Party Control
∆Majority Partyt 14.26∗ 8.83∗ 8.25∗
(3.52) (3.54) (3.64)
Error Correction and Constant
Error Correction (Yt−1) -0.24∗ -0.43∗ -0.46∗
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
Constantt -7.54 -13.44 -8.06
(15.84) (9.44) (3.65)
Model Fit and Diagnostics
Adj. R2 0.49 0.59 0.58
BIC 387.35 375.29 381.95
Dickey-Fuller Test (β) -1.05† -1.02† -1.01†
Note: N=57. ∗p ≤ 0.05, one-tailed test; †p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test. The dependent variable is the change
in policy activity liberalism from t − 1 to t. Standard errors are in parentheses. Long-run multipliers =
(βi/ − αi). Standard errors of the long-run multiplier are computed using the Bewley transformation.
Dickey-Fuller tests assess the null hypothesis of a unit root process in each model’s residuals.
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Table A.6: Full ECM of Table 5.2: Policy Responsiveness to Public,
In-Party, and Independent Mood in the U.S. Senate, 1951-2008.
Replication In-Partisans Only Full Model
Short-Run Effects
∆Moodt -0.36
(0.42)
∆In-Party Moodt -0.13 -0.15
(0.30) (0.41)
∆Independent Moodt 0.05
(0.39)
∆Percentage Democratict 0.95∗ 0.83∗ 0.85∗
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
Long-Run Effects
Moodt−1 0.03
(0.33)
In-Party Moodt−1 0.12 0.30∗
(0.12) (0.16)
Independent Moodt−1 -0.37
(0.21)
Percentage Democratict−1 0.33 0.24 0.26
(0.23) (0.21) (0.21)
Long-Run Multipliers
Moodt−1 0.06
(0.33)
In-Party Moodt−1 0.23∗ 0.48∗
(0.13) (0.16)
Independent Moodt−1 -0.60†
(0.21)
Percentage Democratict−1 0.62∗ 0.45∗ 0.49∗
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
Senate Party Control
∆Majority Partyt 8.02∗ 7.47∗ 7.45∗
(3.53) (3.55) (3.52)
Error Correction and Constant
Error Correction (Yt−1) -0.53∗ -0.54∗ -0.62∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Constantt 7.81 8.09 22.04
(14.10) (7.41) (11.26)
Model Fit and Diagnostics
Adj. R2 0.46 0.47 0.48
BIC 401.55 400.73 405.40
Dickey-Fuller Test (β) -1.10† -1.07† -1.04†
Note: N=57. ∗p ≤ 0.05, one-tailed test; †p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test. The dependent variable is the change
in policy activity liberalism from t − 1 to t. Standard errors are in parentheses. Long-run multipliers =
(βi/ − αi). Standard errors of the long-run multiplier are computed using the Bewley transformation.
Dickey-Fuller tests assess the null hypothesis of a unit root process in each model’s residuals.
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Table A.7: Rational Anticipation Policy Responsiveness to Public, In-Party,
and Independent Mood in the U.S. House, 1951-2008.
Replication Reduced Form Model Full Model
Constituency Electorate In-Partisans Reelection
Short-Run Effects
∆Moodt 0.72∗
(0.36)
∆In-Party Moodt 0.71∗ 0.83∗
(0.24) (0.34)
∆Independent Moodt -0.16
(0.33)
House Controls
∆Percentage Democratict 0.61∗ 0.67∗ 0.67∗
(0.23) (0.22) (0.23)
∆Majority Partyt 14.48∗ 13.65∗ 13.62∗
(3.47) (3.31) (3.33)
Error Correction and Constant
Error Correction (Yt−1) -0.13∗ -0.13∗ -0.13∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.16)
Constantt 7.56† 7.68† 8.00†
(3.37) (3.23) (3.32)
Model Fit and Diagnostics
Adj. R2 0.49 0.53 0.53
BIC 381.19 376.42 380.20
Dickey-Fuller Test (β) -1.13† -1.13† -1.14†
Note: N=57. ∗p ≤ 0.05, one-tailed test; †p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test. The dependent variable is the change in
policy activity liberalism from t− 1 to t. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dickey-Fuller tests assess the null
hypothesis of a unit root process in each model’s residuals.
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Table A.8: Rational Anticipation Policy Responsiveness to Public, In-Party,
and Independent Mood in the U.S. Senate, 1951-2008.
Replication Reduced Form Model Full Model
Constituency Electorate In-Partisans Reelection
Short-Run Effects
∆Moodt -0.53
(0.41)
∆In-Party Moodt -0.37 -0.38
(0.28) (0.41)
∆Independent Moodt 0.01
(0.41)
Senate Controls
∆Percentage Democratict 0.81∗ 0.79∗ 0.78∗
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
∆Majority Partyt 8.25∗ 8.52∗ 8.52∗
(3.54) (3.54) (3.58)
Error Correction and Constant
Error Correction (Yt−1) -0.38∗ -0.35∗ -0.35∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Constantt 19.86† 18.65† 18.61†
(4.93) (4.90) (5.14)
Model Fit and Diagnostics
Adj. R2 0.45 0.45 0.58
BIC 397.38 397.31 401.35
Dickey-Fuller Test (β) -1.17† -1.15† -0.97†
Note: N=57. ∗p ≤ 0.05, one-tailed test; †p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test. The dependent variable is the change in
policy activity liberalism from t− 1 to t. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dickey-Fuller tests assess the null
hypothesis of a unit root process in each model’s residuals.
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Table A.9: The Influence of Public, In-Party, and Independent Mood on
Policy Activity Liberalism in the U.S. House, 1951-2008.
Replication Reduced Form Model Full Model
Constituency Electorate In-Partisans Reelection
Opinion Effects
Moodt−1 -0.04
(0.24)
In-Party Moodt−1 0.27∗ 0.39∗
(0.14) (0.21)
Independent Moodt−1 -0.17
(0.20)
House Controls
Percentage Democratict−1 0.42∗ 0.42∗ 0.36∗
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
∆Majority Partyt 13.08∗ 13.08∗ 12.58∗
(3.87) (3.87) (3.93)
Dynamics and Constant
Dynamics (Yt−1) 0.73∗ 0.57∗ 0.54∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.13)
Constantt -4.69 -15.20 -7.71
(14.80) (9.58) (13.09)
Model Fit and Diagnostics
Adj. R2 0.79 0.80 0.80
BIC 389.46 385.90 389.16
Dickey-Fuller Test (β) -1.05† -1.06† -1.06†
Note: N=57. ∗p ≤ 0.05, one-tailed test; †p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test. The dependent variable is the level of policy
activity liberalism at time t. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dickey-Fuller tests assess the null hypothesis of
a unit root process in each model’s residuals.
107
Table A.10: The Influence of Public, In-Party, and Independent Mood on
Policy Activity Liberalism in the U.S. Senate, 1951-2008.
Replication Reduced Form Model Full Model
Constituency Electorate In-Partisans Reelection
Opinion Effects
Moodt−1 0.08
(0.33)
In-Party Moodt−1 0.15 0.32∗
(0.12) (0.16)
Independent Moodt−1 -0.37
(0.22)
Senate Controls
Percentage Democratict−1 0.43∗ 0.33 0.35∗
(0.23) (0.21) (0.20)
∆Majority Partyt 11.39∗ 10.55∗ 10.57∗
(2.98) (3.00) (2.95)
Dynamics and Constant
Dynamics (Yt−1) 0.43∗ 0.40∗ 0.33∗
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Constantt 1.69 4.46 18.80
(13.63) (7.14) (10.88)
Model Fit and Diagnostics
Adj. R2 0.54 0.55 0.57
BIC 397.68 396.12 396.94
Dickey-Fuller Test (β) -1.00† -0.99† -0.97†
Note: N=57. ∗p ≤ 0.05, one-tailed test; †p ≤ 0.05, two-tailed test. The dependent variable is the level of policy
activity liberalism at time t. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dickey-Fuller tests assess the null hypothesis of
a unit root process in each model’s residuals.
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